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INTRODUCTION
Supreme Court decisionmaking treats the line separating law
from fact as consequential, often outcome-determinative. Court deci-
sions do not even hint at the possibility that the Court’s choice of
whether it should create fact-dependent standards of review or, alter-
natively, fact-insensitive rules is a by-product of exogenous variables,
including the Justices’ views on congressional factfinding. Rather, the
Court speaks in platitudes about how “say[ing] what the law is” is at
the core of Article III. In contrast, the power to find facts, while not
irrelevant to the exercise of judicial authority,1 is not considered cen-
tral to the judicial function.2 Indeed, pointing to Congress’s “role of
weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative process,”3 the Court
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1. See, e.g., Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 129 (1989) (noting that the
presence of legislative findings “would not foreclose [the Court’s] independent judgment” of
pertinent constitutional facts).
2. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915) (holding
that not every person affected by a broad administrative decision is entitled to a direct voice in
its adoption).
3. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 199 (1997). For a useful criticism of
Turner Broadcasting, see Note, Deference to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amend-
ment Cases After Turner Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2329 (1998) (criticizing the
“patchwork doctrine for determining the level of deference due to legislative fact determina-
tions” established by the case).
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treats the separation of powers as demanding a de minimis judicial
role in questioning the accuracy of such findings.4
Part I of this Essay challenges this longstanding assumption, ar-
guing that the law-fact divide is a shibboleth, something that the
Court invokes to justify a conclusion about whether it or Congress
should settle an issue, not something with independent analytical
force. Correspondingly, this Essay suggests that when employing fact-
dependent reasoning, the Court is speaking more of its agreement
with Congress on the merits than anything else.
Part II casts doubt on a related assumption, namely, that as a
matter of comparative institutional competence, the Court is better at
sorting out the law and legislators are better equipped to get the facts
right. In particular, while Congress has superior factfinding capacities,
it often lacks the institutional incentives to take factfinding seriously.
By calling attention to how problematic and difficult it is for the
Court to navigate the law-fact divide, this Essay is a first step in redi-
recting attention to the real world problems of drawing sharp and dis-
cernible lines separating the judicial and legislative functions. Part III
ventures beyond these positive claims and tackles the question of how
the Supreme Court ought to take into account Congress’s interest in
getting the facts right. Through the use of case studies, Part III offers
a preliminary assessment of the ways in which the Court can sort out
whether Congress has the proper incentives to take factfinding seri-
ously. In so doing, Part III also draws attention to a paradox in consti-
tutional decisionmaking—the Court’s employment of open-ended,
fact-dependent standards often make it difficult for the Court to take
a hard look at congressional factfinding. Specifically, because of limits
on its own factfinding, the Court cannot disavow traditionalist as-
sumptions (embraced in Court decisionmaking) about both Con-
4. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., 520 U.S. at 195 (“We owe Congress’ findings deference in part
because the institution is far better equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data bearing upon legislative questions.”) (quotations omitted); Metro Broad., Inc.
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 572 (1990) (“The ‘special attribute [of Congress] as a legislative body lies
in its broader mission to investigate and consider all facts and opinions that may be relevant to
the resolution of an issue.’”) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980));
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 425 (1988) (“Congressional competence at balancing gov-
ernmental efficiency and the rights of [individuals] is no more questionable in the social welfare
context than it is in the civil service context.”) (quotations omitted). For a competing interpreta-
tion of recent Court precedents, see A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J. Simeone, Remanding
to Congress: The Supreme Court’s New “On the Record” Constitutional Review of Federal Stat-
utes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 396 (2001) (“[T]he Court’s new approach [requiring an extensive
legislative record to justify legislation] is simply inconsistent with the political realities of con-
gressional factfinding.”); see also infra note 18 (critiquing Bryant and Simeone).
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gress’s comparative advantage in factfinding and Congress’s author-
ity, under the separation of powers, to sort out the facts underlying its
handiwork. Consequently, by describing an issue as one of fact, not
law, the Court, in effect, is saying that Congress is the branch best po-
sitioned to decide the matter.
This Essay aims at advancing not only a system of empirically in-
formed constitutional jurisprudence5 but also a system that allows
Congress, when circumstances warrant, to play a decisive role in the
shaping of constitutional values. In particular, rather than sort
through the legitimacy of courts “making policy” through the applica-
tion of fact-dependent balancing tests, this Essay is intended to push
the Supreme Court to embrace standards of review that take into ac-
count the comparative institutional strengths and weaknesses of both
Congress and the courts. Sometimes these standards will favor the
government (when Congress is a reliable factfinder); sometimes these
standards will limit governmental action (when, for example, congres-
sional factfinding is little more than a recitation of special-interest
preferences).6
By highlighting the contaminating impact of special interests on
congressional factfinding, moreover, this Essay addresses one of the
fundamental questions in constitutional law, that is, the need to check
Congress from acting on behalf of special interests, to the exclusion of
the public interest.7 By recommending that the Supreme Court deploy
standards of review that take Congress’s interest in factfinding into
account, this Essay calls for the Court to check Congress when the
5. For recent commentary on the role that facts should play in constitutional decision-
making, see Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (1998)
(arguing that “the lack of an empirical footing” is the “Achilles heel of constitutional law”); see
also Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge Posner,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1287, 1291-93 (1999) (arguing that empirical studies “can influence” but
“can’t resolve constitutional issues”).
6. Needless to say, factfinding is not the sole variable in judicial decisionmaking. The Jus-
tices will also take into account theories of interpretation, stare decisis, the political climate, and
much more. At the same time, the quality of congressional factfinding is certainly relevant, and,
as such, it is useful to think of the ways in which the Court can take factfinding into account
when crafting standards of review.
7. Recognizing that interest groups “have peculiar power to use the government to ex-
propriate resources for themselves,” for example, constitutional structures seek to protect
against special-interest rent-seeking. John O. McGinnis, The Original Constitution and Its De-
cline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 195, 197 (1997). In linking my
project to the question of special-interest capture, I am not suggesting that courts should defer
to Congress when legislative uninterest in factfinding is tied to popular support for a law. See
infra notes 107-18 (highlighting populist support for federalism-related initiatives). While politi-
cally popular lawmaking may serve the public interest, an empirically minded Court cares most
about Congress’s interest in getting the facts right. See infra note 177.
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risk of special-interest capture seems especially significant.8 More to
the point, because of the difficulties of the Court second-guessing
legislative factfinding, this Essay sends a cautionary note to Justices
inclined to make use of fact-dependent standards in upholding con-
gressional decisionmaking.9
I.  THE ILLUSORY FACT-LAW DISTINCTION
Is the Court’s characterization of an issue as being one of law or
one of fact driven by a desire to reach a particular outcome? Alterna-
tively, is the law-fact divide a by-product of the very real differences
between the institutional authority and competence of the Court and
Congress?10 Answers to these questions lie in the opinions and institu-
tional incentives of the Court.
To start, Supreme Court opinions suggest that the line separating
law from facts, if not artificial, is indeterminate. Consider, for exam-
ple, the Court’s recent decisions in Dickerson v. United States (re-
jecting Congress’s efforts to undo the Miranda warning)11 and United
States v. Morrison (invalidating the Violence Against Women Act).12
In both cases, the Court sidestepped the question of whether the fac-
tual premises underlying Congress’s handiwork were correct;13 in-
8. In contrast, when powerful special interests combat each other, the public interest is
served, and, as such, there is less reason to check Congress. For an analogous argument, see
generally Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 3 CONST.
COMMENT. 395 (1986) (arguing that out-of-state business interests are almost always able to
protect themselves at both the state and federal levels, and, consequently, the Supreme Court
should limit the scope of its dormant Commerce Clause decisionmaking).
9. In this way, an empirically informed jurisprudence is appealing both to Justices inter-
ested in the correctness of Congress’s underlying factual premises and to Justices whose inter-
pretive theories are grounded in the belief that the Constitution is principally a bulwark against
special-interest capture.
10. In researching this question, I greatly benefited from Saul M. Pilchen, Politics v. The
Cloister: Deciding When the Supreme Court Should Defer to Congressional Factfinding Under
the Post-Civil War Amendments, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337 (1984) (criticizing the factfinding
theory used to justify enhanced congressional power under the post–Civil War amendments).
11. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
12. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
13. The factual finding in Dickerson concerned whether or not custodial interrogations are
inherently coercive and intimidating. The Miranda Court said yes. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 533 (1966). Congress, responding to Miranda, said no. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 54-55 (1968).
For further discussion, see generally Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Mar-
riage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 123-32; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional
Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199, 249-50 (1971) (discussing the Supreme Court’s refusal
to set aside legislative findings of constitutional fact in a wide variety of situations). Morrison
likewise centered on the relevance of “a voluminous” record, finding, among other things, that
domestic violence and sexual assault reduced the mobility of women employees as well as “their
production and consumption of goods shipped in interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at
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stead, the Court concluded that, as a matter of law, Congress’s factual
inquiry was beside the point.14 The dissenting opinions in both Morri-
son and Dickerson, however, made use of quite different legal stan-
dards—standards by which congressional factfinding was anything but
irrelevant.15 Indeed, the Morrison dissent is replete both with ap-
proving references to “the mountain of data assembled by Congress”
and paeans to “Congress, whose institutional capacity for gathering
evidence and taking testimony far exceeds” that of the Court.16
Another example of this phenomenon is the rights-remedy dis-
tinction that the Court now utilizes in assessing Congress’s power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. When overturning the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the Court, in City of Boerne v.
Flores, drew a sharp line between Congress’s power to “remed[y]
constitutional violations” and the Court’s power to set forth the
meaning of a constitutional right and thereby to “say what the law
is.”17 This standard, however, is indeterminate; when applying it, the
Justices often disagree about whether Congress’s action speaks to
rights (so that factfinding is not particularly relevant) or remedies
(where factfinding is often dispositive).18 For instance, in rulings that
635-36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 54 (1994)). Congress also found
that the annual cost of domestic violence to the economy was $5 to $10 billion a year. Id. at 635
(quoting S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 41 (1994)). In challenging the constitutionality of the statute,
however, Morrison argued that “[t]he only ‘findings’ concerning gender-based, animus-
motivated violence are in the final Conference Report, findings so broad and conclusory that
they . . . add virtually nothing to the record.” Brief of Respondent Antonio J. Morrison at 24,
U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
14. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431-33; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 684.
15. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 431 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting “the power of the Supreme
Court to write a prophylactic, extraconstitutional Constitution, binding on Congress and the
States”); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 683 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Congress has the power to legislate
with regard to activity that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”).
16. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 683 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 684-85 (Souter, J., dis-
senting) (detailing some of the evidence before Congress).
17. 521 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1997). Consequently, although the RFRA contained findings that
intentional discrimination against religion can only be prevented by treating governmental con-
duct that burdens religion as constitutionally suspect, the Court concluded that Congress’s in-
terest was altering, not enforcing, the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at 519. For an excellent treat-
ment of this topic, see generally Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial
Equilibrium, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857 (1999) (addressing the “rights/remedies” distinction in
constitutional law as a means to protect the “privileged status of constitutional rights”).
18. This formula treats the law-fact divide as consequential. When Congress is remedying
discrimination (a decision grounded in hard facts), Congress wins; when Congress is seeking to
redefine a constitutional right (a decision about legal norms), it loses. For this reason, claims
that the Rehnquist Court is disavowing traditionalist deference to legislative factfinding seem
somewhat overblown. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 4, at 369-89 (criticizing at length this
“new approach” of the Rehnquist Court). No doubt, by “aggressive[ly]” examining “the formal
legislative record” to see if it adequately supports congressional action, the Rehnquist Court (on
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Congress could not extend either age discrimination or disability
rights protections to state workers, the Court divided five to four on
whether these cases were about rights (law) or remedies (facts).19
Morrison, Dickerson, and Flores are hardly unusual. The Justices
frequently squabble over the appropriate standard of review to apply
and, with it, the types of facts (if any) that are relevant to their deci-
sionmaking.20 Whether characterizing a matter as one of law or fact is
Section 5 matters) is willing to second-guess congressional factfinding. Id. at 330. But the Court
is undertaking this enterprise as part and parcel of its power to “say what the law is”; in par-
ticular, if the Court concludes that Congress has not demonstrated that the states have acted
unconstitutionally (the factual predicate for a Section 5 remedy), the Justices see Congress’s
action as interfering with the Court’s power to define constitutional rights. For an empirically
minded Court, as I will argue in Part III.B of this Essay, this formula allows it to sort out the
seriousness of congressional factfinding without departing from traditionalist norms associated
with the law-fact divide. See infra notes 101-33 and accompanying text.
19. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967-68 (2000) (exempting
states from civil suits under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and exposing a disagreement
between the majority and the dissent over whether Congress made sufficient findings to show
that the states had engaged in pervasive unconstitutional discrimination against the disabled);
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (concluding that Congress “had no reason
to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was necessary” to extend age discrimination pro-
tections to state workers). In both cases, the Court took aim at Congress. In Kimel, the majority
concluded that “Congress’ 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an unwarranted response
to a perhaps inconsequential problem.” Id. at 89. In Garrett, according to the dissent, the major-
ity downplayed the fact that “hundreds of examples of discrimination by state and local gov-
ernments . . . were submitted to [a congressional] task force” as part of Congress’s factfinding
efforts. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 972 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Instead, the majority—noting that
Congress made no formal findings of “a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by the States”—
downplayed this evidence (describing it as “unexamined, anecdotal accounts of ‘adverse,
disparate treatment by state officials’”). Id. at 966 (quoting Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 970 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
By placing the onus on Congress to demonstrate that it is remedying unconstitutional
governmental action, the rights-remedy distinction enables the Court to declare a matter as a
“question of law” when it disapproves of congressional factfinding. See supra note 18; infra Part
III.B. Another recent example of this phenomenon is Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). In rejecting legislative efforts to
protect patent rights by abrogating state sovereign immunity, a majority of the Justices con-
cluded that Congress did not identify a “pattern of patent infringement by the States, let alone a
pattern of constitutional violations.” Id. at 640. Consequently, these Justices rejected efforts to
depict the Patent Remedy Act as a remedy to unconstitutional state conduct. In contrast, four
dissenting Justices, after detailing Congress’s extensive factfinding on the issue, concluded that
“Congress had sufficient evidence of due process violations, whether actual or potential, to meet
the requirement we expressed in City of Boerne that Congress can act under § 5 only to ‘remedy
or prevent unconstitutional actions.’” Id. at 660 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting); see also David Cole, The Value of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Flores
and Congressional Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 31, 67-69 (calling atten-
tion to the difficulty of distinguishing a right from a remedy); Cox, supra note 13, at 233-34
(calling attention to how it is that “questions of fact” for one Justice may be seen by another
Justice as a value-laden process of “striking a balance between incommensurate interests”).
20. E.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (employing different legal stan-
dards, between the majority and dissent, in assessing Congress’s Commerce Clause power, and
therefore disagreeing over the relevance of the fact that “[n]either the statute nor its legislative
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simply “a conclusion . . . that one branch of government rather than
another should make the decision in question,”21 it is undoubtedly
true that a Justice’s views on the merits and her views on whether the
case turns on law or facts are often one and the same. Justices sympa-
thetic to the goals of a particular statute, if not Congress itself, typi-
cally see the issue before them as one of fact; Justices skeptical of
Congress, in contrast, are more apt to see the issue as one of law.
This practice will likely continue. The Court is unlikely to depart
from the traditionalist view that the separation of powers places the
finding of social facts squarely within the realm of the lawmaking
power.22 Furthermore, lacking the power to appropriate funds or
command the military, the Court understands that its decisions must
garner public acceptance.23 For these reasons, the Justices can ill af-
ford to act as super-lawmakers, striking down legislation whenever
their views of the facts vary from Congress’s;24 instead, the Justices are
on firmer footing by grounding their decisions (especially those
striking down acts of Congress) in legal interpretations. It is thus un-
doubtedly the case that unless and until the nation is convinced that
history contains findings regarding the effects upon interstate commerce of gun possession in a
school zone”) (quotations omitted); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 572, 579, 629
(1990) (questioning whether “[e]ven the most express and lavishly documented congressional
declaration” on affirmative action was sufficient under intermediate or strict scrutiny review, or,
alternatively, whether the Court “must give great weight” to legislative findings thereby allow-
ing Congress to “legislate without compiling” a detailed record); see also Pilchen, supra note 10,
at 380-96 (detailing other examples).
21. Pilchen, supra note 10, at 396-97. Nearly seventy years ago, Stanley Surrey—then a
young attorney working for the National Labor Relations Board—likewise suggested that the
Court’s view of good public policy would play an instrumental role in its characterization of an
issue as one of fact or law. Specifically, in a memo assessing the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act, Surrey emphasized that the Court’s willingness to tie its decisionmaking to
congressional findings is, ultimately, a question of “how radical a departure from existing consti-
tutional theory and generally accepted forms of legislative control the Court deems the” Act to
be. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional Adjudication,
and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 699 (1996) (quoting Surrey’s memo-
randum).
22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915) (holding that the Constitution does not demand due pro-
cess in lawmaking, for “[w]here a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people it is imprac-
ticable that every one should have a direct voice in its adoption”).
23. Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretionary
Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703, 715
(1994) (discussing the link between “public acceptance” of the Court and the Court’s institu-
tional legitimacy). Chief Justice Rehnquist has also recognized this connection between its “le-
gitimacy” and the “people’s acceptance.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 965-66
(1992) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
24. I should add that the President is implicated in this as well, for the President signs bills
into law.
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the Supreme Court is a better factfinder than Congress, the Court
places itself at peril by declaring that Congress got the facts, not the
law, wrong. Where facts should come into play, as I have suggested
above, is in the selection of standards of review.
For these very reasons, the Justices should act cautiously before
embracing fact-dependent standards of review. These standards, by
constraining the Court’s power to second-guess legislative decision-
making, give Congress the upper hand. For example, following its
1937 embrace of the fact-dependent “affecting commerce” standard,
the Court regularly looked to legislative findings establishing a link
between New Deal initiatives and interstate commerce.25 As a result,
the Court has been extremely deferential to Congress; it has only
once cast doubt on legislative factfinding in its Commerce Clause de-
cisionmaking.26 In other words, by choosing a fact-dependent standard
of review, the Court severely limited its ability to check Congress.
While the Court should carefully weigh the risks of adopting fact-
dependent standards, it is unclear to what extent the Court’s attitudes
towards congressional factfinding affect the Justices’ views of whether
it should employ fact-dependent standards of review. No doubt, just
as theories of interpretation, ideology, and fear of elected govern-
ment reprisal temper the Court’s decisionmaking, “perceptions about
social facts regularly tip the balance between competing constitu-
tional rights or affect the definition of legitimate state interests and
individual rights.”27
But in sorting out these social facts, does the Court pay close at-
tention to the seriousness by which Congress finds facts? The Court,
while making use of legislative findings in its decisions, does not de-
mand that Congress find facts, hold hearings, or otherwise employ
procedures designed to improve the quality of its factfinding.28 At the
25. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
26. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995) (finding that “to the extent that con-
gressional findings would enable [the Court] to evaluate the legislative judgment that the activ-
ity in question substantially affected interstate commerce, even though no such substantial ef-
fect was visible to the naked eye, they are lacking [in Lopez]”).
27. Peggy C. Davis, “There is a Book Out . . .”: An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Leg-
islative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1590 (1987) (discussing Smith v. OFFER, 431 U.S. 816
(1977), a decision whose standard of review can be directly tied to the Court’s perceptions of the
conflicting social science evidence presented to it); see also Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Law-
making, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 935-38 (1980) (considering the use of factual data in Supreme
Court decisionmaking); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Stat-
utes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1357 (1990)
(asserting that facts “unquestionably shape the evolution of the rules themselves”).
28. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 4, at 355-69 (considering whether heightened scru-
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same time, there is reason to doubt that the Court assumes Congress
to be a reliable factfinder (so that judicial skepticism of legislative
factfinding may affect the decision to characterize an issue as one of
law, not fact). The Court, for example, may have seen the RFRA as
little more than special-interest politics29 and the Miranda override
statute as “election year symbol[ism].”30 In other words, skepticism of
Congress’s factfinding may have been a contributing factor in ex-
plaining why the Court in both City of Boerne and Dickerson de-
picted the issues before them as questions of law, not fact.31
If one values an empirically informed jurisprudence, congres-
sional attitudes toward factfinding should figure prominently in the
Justices’ decision to treat a question as one of law or fact. How then
should the Court sort out the quality of congressional factfinding?
Should the Court look to legislative history—depicting an issue as one
of fact when Congress makes findings of facts, holds hearings, etc.?
Should it make use of a prophylactic rule—assuming either that Con-
gress is institutionally superior to the courts in getting the facts right
or, alternatively, that Congress is captured by special interests and,
consequently, is an unreliable factfinder? Any attempt at answering
these questions must begin with an analysis of the comparative
strengths and weaknesses of judicial and congressional factfinding.
II.  FACTFINDING IN CONGRESS AND THE COURTS
Judicial deference to legislative factfinding is premised on the
mutually reinforcing beliefs that the lawmaking process is better
suited to finding social facts32 than is adjudication and that the Consti-
tution leaves it to lawmakers, not judges, to make policy by finding
social facts. By itself, however, this rationale is hardly convincing. Af-
tiny of the legislative record in constitutional cases is consistent with Supreme Court precedent
and specifically discussing what the Court has required of Congress in its capacity as factfinder).
29. See infra notes 115-18.
30. Brief of Amicus Curiae House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v. United States,
530 U.S. 428 (2000); see also Michael C. Dorf & Barry Friedman, Shared Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming May 2001) (noting that “a Congress that wishes def-
erence has to earn it. Section 3501 [the Miranda override statute] was hardly deserving of such
respect”); Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
927 (2000) (arguing that Congress was not at all interested in working within the constitutional
parameters set forth in Miranda).
31. No doubt, these decisions are also about the Court defending its institutional turf. In
both cases, Congress sought to override a controversial decision of which it disapproved.
32. Social (or legislative) facts “are the recurrent patterns of behavior on which policy must
be based”; adjudicative facts “are the events that have transpired between the parties to a law-
suit.” DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 45 (1977).
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ter all, as Part I suggests, the law-fact distinction may be a judicial
conceit—something used to prop up a conclusion about whether the
Court or Congress should settle an issue. Indeed, as this part will
show, it is hardly self-evident that the legislative process does a better
job of uncovering social facts than does adjudication.
In sorting through whether lawmakers or courts are more apt to
engage in accurate factfinding, this part will make a quick tour of the
comparative strengths and weakness of the two branches, considering
both institutional capacity and institutional incentives. The concern
here is not so much resolving the question of which branch does a
better job; rather, it is to suggest that the answer to this question is
highly contextual—Congress does a better job when it has the incen-
tive to get the facts right while the courts may do a better job when
the litigants skillfully present conflicting social science data.33
A. The Traditionalist’s Argument: Congress Can Do It; Courts
Cannot
Congress has numerous advantages over the courts in pursuing
information. Legislatures, as compared to courts, “have substantial
staff, funds, time and procedures to devote to effective information
gathering and sorting.”34 These assets are perhaps best employed in
the committee system, which allows lawmaker experts to acquire ex-
tensive knowledge on questions of interest to them.35 Armed with the
power to subpoena witnesses and otherwise do what is “necessary and
proper” to allow Congress to effectively act on its legislative powers,
committees operate both as legislative “gatekeepers” and “policy in-
33. Courts may also do a better job of factfinding when judges are willing to assume the
role of policymaker, not adjudicator. See generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE (1998) (analyzing policymaking
as a distinct, and even legitimate, judicial function). To do so, however, may risk the courts’ in-
stitutional legitimacy. Neal Devins, I Love You Big Brother, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1283, 1285-89
(1999) (critiquing Feeley and Rubin’s claim that federal courts can engage in policymaking
much the same way as an administrative agency).
34. Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994). Judges do not have investigative or research staffs. Conse-
quently, judges may have difficulty translating scientific and other studies. They may not know
the scientific method and the importance of validity, replicability, etc., to social science data.
Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research
Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1986).
35. See generally CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING & STEVEN S. SMITH, COMMITTEES IN
CONGRESS (3d ed. 1997) (examining the current state of committees and committee systems in
the House and Senate); KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE ORGANIZATION
(1991) (contending that Congress organizes into committees so that its members may gain ex-
pertise).
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cubators.”36 Unconstrained by the need to decide a particular case at a
particular moment in time, moreover, legislative committees may
conduct hearings over a number of months, even years, before acting.
Furthermore, rather than rely on party arguments and amicus filings,
committees may act affirmatively—using their subpoena power to call
any and all witnesses who may assist Congress in sorting out the facts.
If that is not enough, committees can also seek expert advice from
any one of a number of legislative support services, including the
Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office.37
More generally, Congress is not limited by rules against ex parte
communications or other prohibitions on information gathering. In-
stead, members of Congress and the senior staff who advise them may
inform themselves by speaking with each other, “lobbyists, [other]
staff, friends and constituents, by [attending] fact-finding junkets, by
reviewing past legislation or even by reading a novel or watching
television.”38 Also, unlike the judiciary, “[t]he greater number of
members [of Congress] and their varied backgrounds and experience
make it virtually certain that the typical legislature will command
wider knowledge and keener appreciation of current social and eco-
nomic conditions than will the typical court.”39 Correspondingly, the
geographic diversity among lawmakers ensures that Congress will
take regional differences into account when assessing the costs and
benefits of proposed legislation. In these ways, Congress, a truly rep-
resentative body, is better positioned to find facts than the federal ju-
diciary, whose judges and advocates are trained in a single discipline
and, for the most part, are otherwise stratified by class, ambition, and
the like.40
36. Cox, supra note 13, at 209 (asserting that the subpoena power allows legislative com-
mittees to develop the “relevant data”); Daniel A. Farber & Philip B. Frickey, Legislative Intent
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 448 (1988) (arguing, contrary to Justice Scalia, that
Congress’s committees are involved in the details of legislation and, as such, are well aware of
the contents of their reports).
37. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV.
707, 730 (1985) (noting, however, that GAO lawyers are hesitant to question the constitutional-
ity of a statute).
38. Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: “The Illusion of Certainty,” 46 HASTINGS L.
J. 1723, 1743 (1995).
39. Cox, supra note 13, at 209; see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION
AWAY FROM THE COURTS 68 (1999) (asserting that “[l]egislators in ordinary politics are [more]
deeply embedded in the realities of public life” than are judges). For a competing perspective,
see MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED REPRESENTATIVES 247 (1980) (arguing that policy in
Congress is made by “staff technocrats . . . whose knowledge of the world is limited to what they
learned in school or from other participants in the specialized Washington issue networks”).
40. In other words, while judicial factfinding has no public anchor, elections make the Con-
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Congress’s unique ability to gather and assess information, while
critically important, tells only part of the story. Congress need not de-
cide a case once and forever by issuing a decision that constrains it in
subsequent decisionmaking. “Unlike judges, legislators can simulta-
neously address a variety of issues, thus facilitating the development
of public policy that reflects a fair balance of competing interests.”41
Even more significantly, Congress is not constrained by stare decisis.
It can correct its mistakes in ways that the Court cannot. Specifically,
Congress’s legitimacy is not at all tied to whether it stands above the
hurly burly of politics by adhering to precedent. Quite the contrary:
Congress’s legitimacy, as Frank Michelman describes it, is that the
legislature is the “forum for identifying or defining [objectives], and
acting towards those ends.”42
Courts, as compared to lawmakers, are shackled by the temporal
and reactive nature of litigation. Specifically, with judges and advo-
cates relying on precedent-based legal arguments, courts simply can-
not engage in thorough cost-benefit analysis. Courts are also ham-
strung in that they decide cases at a moment in time, so that a
changed understanding of the underlying facts can only be corrected
through a reversal. Correspondingly, judges must operate around
“real time” constraints; rather than risk a backlog of cases, judges
must do the best they can with the information that they have.43 For
the Supreme Court, real-world limits on the number of cases it can
review necessarily leave broad decisionmaking authority in the fed-
eral courts of appeal, courts that “are not national in their scope” and
who may disagree over standards of review, the relevance of certain
facts, and much more.44
gress representative of public views. Furthermore, to the extent that the public itself finds social
facts by choosing who it elects, congressional factfinding reflects the current national view.
41. Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311,
327 (1987). For this very reason, Ross argues that the legislative process is well designed to
“analyze the detailed and complex problem of whether a given classification can be justified
despite its overbreadth or underinclusiveness.” Id.
42. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing
Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 149 (1977). For this very rea-
son, the Constitution (rightly or wrongly) “presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipa-
thy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.” Vance v.
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
43. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitu-
tional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 636 (1994) (noting that one shortcoming of judicial
constitutional decisionmaking is that “dockets are so crowded that judges can devote little time
even to critical cases”).
44. Frank B. Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
1529, 1549 (2000).
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Furthermore, notwithstanding amicus curiae filings, courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, often rely on the arguments made by the
parties before it.45 Thus the Court, unlike Congress, is constrained by
the parties’ framing of the issues. Correspondingly, the Court may
“anchor” its decisionmaking on its perception of whether the parties
before it are sympathetic or not. Problems may arise, however, when
different parties raising identical legal issues may appear more or less
sympathetic and, as such, the Court’s decision may well be tied to the
accident of which plaintiff presents its case to the Court.46
Making matters worse, the Justices may engage in “motivated
reasoning,” that is, a desire to understand the facts through the lens of
prevailing social norms.47 Finally, the Justices may be animated, in
part, by political ideology. As such, rather than try to get the facts
right, the Justices may spin the facts to support a desired result.48 And
45. Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 19, 38 (1969)
(noting that the Court “lacks machinery for gathering the wide range of facts and opinions that
should inform the judgment of a prime policymaker,” because, among other things, it must base
its decisions “on the evidence and materials brought before it by the litigants or such similar
information as may be garnered by its very small staff from already existing published data”).
One solution to this problem, suggested by Judge Richard Posner, would have the academy in-
vest its energies into producing empirical studies that will help judges ferret out the factual
premises that underlie legislative decisionmaking. Posner, supra note 5, at 12. In advancing this
proposal, Posner assumes that judges can identify which empirical studies, in fact, are reliable.
However, limitations in staff and training, as well as ideological predispositions, cast doubt on
Posner’s proposal.
46. For an overview treatment of anchoring and other behavioral economics topics, see
Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal Scholar-
ship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1503-06 (1998) (defining “anchoring” and
other behavioral economic concepts that intersect with judicial decisionmaking); see also
HOROWITZ, supra note 32, at 38-45 (noting how interest groups search out sympathetic plain-
tiffs).
47. David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 578-80 (1991) (noting that
social science data is rarely on point and, consequently, judges often manipulate such data).
48. Whether “members of the Supreme Court make decisions largely in terms of their per-
sonal attitudes about policy,” it is demonstrably true that political party affiliation is an excel-
lent predictor of judicial decisionmaking. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 145 (7th
ed. 2001). For empirical studies linking a Justice’s ideology to the decisions that he or she
reaches, see LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICE S MAKE 22-51 (1998) (cast-
ing Justices as policy seekers who pursue a priori goals through judicial decisionmaking);
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 226-31 (1993); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:
A Meta-analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219, 240-43 (1999); see also TUSHNET, supra note 39, at 155
(acknowledging that a judge’s ideology often influences the public’s perception of the judge’s
judicial decisionmaking); Cross, supra note 44, at 1543-44 (providing an overview of scholarly
findings regarding the relationship between ideology and judicial decisionmaking); Frederick
Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 615, 619-24 (2000) (examining sources of judicial decisionmaking). For a compet-
ing perspective, see Neil S. Siegel, Comment, Sen and the Hart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of
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even if political ideology is not explicitly at play, courts are suscepti-
ble to interest group capture.49
B. Rethinking the Congressional Advantage
Congress undoubtedly has the capacity to find social facts, while
the courts face important obstacles in attempting to engage in accu-
rate factfinding.50 Nevertheless, it is far from clear that Congress, in
fact, will do a better job than the courts in this respect. Most critically,
there is good reason to doubt whether Congress has the incentives to
take factfinding seriously.
Public choice theory, for example, suggests that legislators are
motivated solely by self-interest, not the public interest. In particular,
legislators place their desire for reelection ahead of all else.51 Ac-
cordingly, legislation is a commodity that lawmakers provide interest
groups in exchange for campaign contributions, endorsements, and
promises of economic support for the districts they represent. Under
this view, lawmakers could not care less about getting the facts
right—what matters is delivering the goods.52
Whatever one’s opinion of public choice theory, it is certainly
true that lawmakers are partisans and that congressional decision-
making, including factfinding, is often about the pursuit of desired
outcomes. One simple measure of this phenomenon is the role that
party control plays in committee agenda-setting and factfinding.
When the Republicans captured the Senate in 1981, for example, so-
cial conservatives, by gaining control of the Judiciary Committee,53
the Economic Analysis of Judicial Behavior, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1597-1602 (1999) (discussing
the failures of models of judicial behavior that do not adequately account for a judge’s tendency
to be bound by duty and the rule of law).
49. JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW DISTORTS PUBLIC
POLICY 147-81 (1989) (revealing the capture of district and appeals courts in the District of Co-
lumbia by civil rights interests).
50. As Judge Richard Posner put it, the Justices also cannot escape “the unfortunate con-
sequences of judicial ignorance of the social realities behind the issues with which they grapple.”
Posner, supra note 5, at 12.
51. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 873, 891 (1987) (pointing out that a “legislator who is not reelected loses all the other pos-
sible benefits flowing from office”).
52. In delivering the goods, of course, Congress may take factfinding into account. For ex-
ample, there are occasions when a lawmaker who is sloppy with the facts may jeopardize her
chance of being reelected, of successfully pursuing her ideology, or of maintaining status within
her party.
53. Roger H. Davidson & Walter J. Oleszek, Changing the Guard in the U.S. Senate, 9
LEGIS. STUD. Q. 635, 649 (1984) (describing Senator Strom Thurmond’s efforts as the Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee to obtain a conservative majority on his panel). For an ar-
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were able to pursue their agenda with a vengeance, including the con-
sideration of proposed human life legislation. Premised on a congres-
sional finding that life begins at conception, this bill made its way
through a Judiciary Committee subcommittee (including full-blown
hearings and a subcommittee report).54 Were the Democrats in charge
of the Judiciary Committee, it is inconceivable that this bill would
have been taken up at all, let alone made its way through subcommit-
tee.55
The lesson here is that legislative choices, including factfinding,
are driven by agenda-setters.56 In particular, committee chairs can
pack their committees with like-minded thinkers, can determine when
and what the committee investigates, and can arrange hearings in
ways that frustrate the search for the truth.57 For example, committee
staff may screen potential witnesses to ensure that they will say what
gument that the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress likewise resulted in value-driven, fact-
insensitive legislative oversight, see Robert Weissman, Oversight in the Republican Congress;
Hearings Loss, AM. PROSPECT, Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 50, 50 (arguing that “the Republicans have
abandoned any serious effort to use congressional oversight powers to . . . launch meaningful
investigations of serious social problems”).
54. For a discussion of the politics of this legislation, see BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG &
DAVID M. O’BRIEN, ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS 137-47 (1993).
55. Roger H. Davidson, The Lawmaking Congress, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 107
(Autumn 1993) (noting that Democrats had earlier blocked numerous conservative initiatives,
including abortion-related initiatives); see also id. at 108-09 (detailing the nexus between party
affiliation and issues pursued by the Judiciary Committee). For this reason, Kenneth Shepsle
has criticized the public choice model for focusing its energies on the desires of special interests.
Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 240-48 (1992). Specifically, by giving all their emphasis and atten-
tion “to the agents who lobby for legislative products,” Shepsle argues that public choice theo-
rists undervalue the role that party affiliation and ideological predisposition play in legislative
decisionmaking. Id. at 240.
56. C. LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF
LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR IN THE U.S. SENATE 50-53 (1991) (highlighting the nexus between
party control of committees and agenda-setting); William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Con-
stitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to
Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 398, 400 (1988) (arguing that “an appropriately chosen agenda
can lead anywhere an agenda-setter wants” and, consequently, the “Court’s notion that majority
outcomes result from a balancing of all relevant interests has little basis in theory or fact”). For
an argument that this phenomenon is not at all inconsistent with lawmakers’ honest pursuit of
the public interest, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 51, at 883-906 (analyzing methods for ex-
amining the relationship between interest groups, ideology, and legislative choice); Abner J.
Mikva, Foreword to Symposium on Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 167, 167 (1988) (arguing that
good policy decisions emerge from partisan debate).
57. EVANS, supra note 56, at 107-10 (describing the powers of the committee chairman);
see also Davidson, supra note 55, at 107 (describing how, in 1981, Strom Thurmond “recruited a
conservative majority” for the Senate Judiciary Committee); Pilchen, supra note 10, at 367-68
(describing the power of the committee chairman to define the scope of a committee’s investiga-
tion). At the same time, the ranking minority member and her staff chooses some of the wit-
nesses who testify at hearings.
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the committee wants to hear.58 Assuming that committee members ac-
tually attend the hearing, the questioning format typically does not
lend itself to “extended exchanges between members and witnesses,
analysis of different points of view, or in-depth probing of one wit-
ness’s views by another.”59
The quality of the legislative record may be compromised in yet
another important way. When a factual record is assembled, “infor-
mation from a variety of formal and informal sources—including lob-
byists supporting or opposing legislation—can make its way into the
record.”60 In part, lobbyists (as well as senior staffers) understand that
courts sometimes look towards legislative history and, consequently,
that it is useful to pad the legislative history in ways that support their
objectives.61 Ultimately, with fundraising, constituent service, and
other demands, members of Congress cannot pursue knowledge for
knowledge’s sake. Rather, most members simply follow the lead of
agenda-setters within their party.62 And, while a conflict with either
their interest group sponsors or voters may prompt a member to
break ranks with party leaders, it is rarely the case that a member will
risk party opprobrium simply because she views Congress’s factfind-
ing as substandard.
What then of Congress’s power to modify its handiwork? Spe-
cifically, is Congress likely to find out if the factual premises of its en-
58. I speak from experience. On more than one occasion, I have been interviewed by
committee staff—both to confirm that my writings reflect my current thinking as well as to help
identify witnesses who will speak to a particular point. And while some hearings seek witnesses
on both sides of an issue, it is also true that some hearings are stacked to better represent one
side of an issue. E.g., CRAIG & O’BRIEN, supra note 54, at 140 (detailing how Senator John East
was forced to revamp hearings on proposed human life legislation in response to complaints of
bias); Neal Devins, How Not to Challenge the Court, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 652-53
(1998) (highlighting the one-sided nature of Congress’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act
hearings).
59. WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 67
(1978).
60. Note, supra note 3, at 2322.
61. Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 1005, 1016 (1992) (“If no one knew that judges would consult legislative histories, these
records almost certainly would look very different from the records produced today.”). On the
role of staffers in shaping the legislative agenda, compare John C. Yoo, Lawyers in Congress, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 16-18 (Spring 1998) (suggesting that staffers adhere to committee
preferences), with Michael J. Glennon, Who’s the Client? Legislative Lawyering Through the
Rear-View Mirror, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 22-27 (Spring 1998) (noting the ways in
which staffers shape committee decisionmaking).
62. I do not mean to suggest here that members are disinterested either in ideology or
serving the public interest. Rather, those types of battles typically play out in the selection of
party leaders.
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actments are wrong and, if so, is Congress likely to correct factfinding
mistakes? Perhaps, but probably not. To start, Congress is a reactive
institution and, as such, it is doubtful that members keep track of leg-
islation, even legislation they sponsor.63 Rather, when assessing the
implementation of legislative programs, lawmakers make use of the
“fire-alarm” approach, in which their attention is triggered by con-
stituencies through “a system of rules, procedures, and informal prac-
tices that enable individual citizens and organized interest groups to
examine . . . decisions . . . and to seek remedies from [Congress].”64
Consequently, absent interest group pressure, there is little chance
that Congress will revisit the factual predicates of one of its enact-
ments.
Even if interest groups do trigger a “fire alarm,” interest group
pressure and/or lawmaker interest must be sufficiently strong to over-
come the burden of inertia. In particular, if party leaders think that
“‘other measures have a stronger claim on the limited time and en-
ergy of the [legislative] body,’” Congress will leave (not so) well
enough alone.65 Moreover, unless the measure harms those it was in-
tended to benefit, the “fire alarm” is likely to fall on deaf ears. After
all, the interest group triggering the alarm almost certainly opposed
the measure’s enactment.66 Finally, even if the agenda-setter is willing
63. Indeed, in 1993, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and Congress agreed
that the Clerk of the Court ought to inform Congress of instances where the D.C. Circuit con-
strued a congressional statute. The reason for this reform: Congress was not paying attention to
these decisions, some of which invalidated or severely constrained Congress’s handiwork.
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 69-81 (1997) (describing current trends in
statutory communication between the judicial and legislative branches); Abner J. Mikva, Why
Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1825, 1828 (1998) (noting that this experiment has “not caused any flurry of legislative action”
perhaps because Congress is still not paying much attention).
64. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Policy Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984); see also William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 359-
66 (1991) (highlighting the critical role that interest groups play in prompting legislative re-
sponses to court decisions).
65. Lawrence C. Marshall, “Let Congress Do It”: The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statu-
tory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 190-91 (1989) (quoting H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal
Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1395 (1958) (unpublished manu-
script)).
66. In other words, since “many abuses are often implemented on behalf of an agenda set-
ter’s constituents,” it is unlikely that post-implementation factfinding will change the status quo
ante. Shepsle, supra note 55, at 247. There is, however, one important exception to this rule of
thumb: When party leadership in Congress changes, the relative power of interest groups also
changes. As such, a change in party leadership may allow previously disenfranchised interest
groups to trigger “fire alarms.”
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to act, a significant minority within Congress or the President may
well be able to block the legislation.67
Congress’s reputation as a factfinding guru thus appears over-
stated. Indeed, notwithstanding the very real constraints that limit ju-
dicial factfinding, it may be that the courts do a better job of finding
social facts than Congress. To start, while the “adjudicative process
hears and considers less” than the legislative process, there may be a
greater risk of bias in the legislative process.68 In particular, by allow-
ing the opposing parties to “put into contention the major social sci-
ence issues,”69 the adversarial process sometimes yields a fairly com-
plete presentation of the evidence. Correspondingly, although courts
lack the staff and expertise to master social science evidence, they
may well make as much use of this information as lawmakers and
staffers pursuing a predetermined agenda.70 Furthermore, through the
appointment of special masters and the utilization of injunctions to
maintain control over a lawsuit, “policy-making judge[s]” obtain “in-
formation from as many groups as possible,” including “experts in the
67. Marshall, supra note 65, at 188 (noting that the principal power of agenda-setters is not
“the affirmative power to pass legislation” but the negative power to block legislation that they
oppose); see also JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC
CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 103 (1997) (employing game theory analysis of institutional
positioning to explain the legislative response to judicial interpretation).
68. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 141 (1994). In other words, as com-
pared to the judicial process, the legislative process seems more partisan and more subject to
interest group capture.
69. MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND
THE COURTS 207 (1982) (concluding, from an empirical study of sixty-five federal trial court
proceedings, that “the courts seem reasonably well equipped to undertake competent assess-
ments of the conflicting social science data”); see also Pilchen, supra note 10, at 371-73 (discuss-
ing how pretrial discovery and cross-examination of experts facilitates judicial factfinding). On
the other hand, if one of the parties fails to present “potentially significant countervailing argu-
ments,” the adversarial process breaks down. REBELL & BLOCK, supra, at 207; see also
HOROWITZ, supra note 32, at 48 (noting that “[t]he experts are usually partisans, employed by
the parties, and their conclusions . . . provide a skewed picture of the problem they purport to
represent”).
70. Indeed, there is some reason to think that courts are sufficiently skilled to make good
use of this information. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evalu-
ating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 495-517 (1986) (suggest-
ing that courts can work effectively with social science evidence but proposing some reforms
that will improve court review of this evidence). Furthermore, by improving the training of law-
yers and judges and by asking both parties and court-appointed amici to present additional evi-
dence, judicial factfinding can be improved. Davis, supra note 27, at 1598-1603 (exploring judi-
cial techniques for evaluating legislative facts); Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The
Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187, 1240-42 (1975) (proposing that the Supreme Court adopt a panel
of social scientists to investigate matters of legislative fact). Of course, if Supreme Court Justices
are simply putting their ideological preferences into effect, these reform proposals are of little
use. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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field who [have] developed solutions through hands-on experience.”71
Finally, just as stare decisis limits the Court’s ability to reconsider
factfinding mistakes, numerous disincentives stand in the way of Con-
gress’s reconsidering errant factfinding.
That the courts, on occasion, may do a better job factfinding than
Congress is certainly suggestive but hardly conclusive evidence of
how the Supreme Court should look at Congress when deciding
whether to craft fact-dependent standards of review. In particular, the
fact that Congress has the tools but may lack the incentives to take
factfinding seriously does not necessarily mean that the Court should
discount congressional factfinding. Rather, the foregoing comparative
institutional analysis of judicial and legislative factfinding underscores
how difficult and problematic it is for the Supreme Court to take fact-
finding into account when crafting standards of review. Nevertheless,
real-world limits on congressional factfinding cast doubt on the pre-
sumption that Congress is an expert at finding facts and, as such, the
Court—when sorting out whether to embrace fact-dependent stan-
dards of review—can count on Congress to take the relevant facts
into account.
The question remains: Can the Court sort out when Congress has
the institutional incentives to get the facts right? If so, the Court
might be able to categorize when congressional factfinding is
grounded in a hard look at the evidence and, alternatively, when it is
simply a recording of interest group preferences. That enterprise is
the subject of the next part of this Essay.
III.  CASE STUDIES: TOWARDS AN INCENTIVE MODEL
Parts I and II of this Essay have cast doubt on the related as-
sumptions that the law-fact divide is fixed, mandated by the separa-
tion of powers, and sensible in light of Congress’s comparative fact-
finding expertise. In sorting out how the Supreme Court can
determine when Congress is likely to take factfinding seriously, this
part will make use of case studies to look to the incentives that ani-
mate Congress. This case study approach offers several advantages
over the generalist approach of the prior section. First, Supreme
Court decisionmaking is itself built around doctrinal categories. Since
the Justices’ decision about crafting fact-sensitive standards of review
will cut across a category of doctrine, there is significant risk in over-
71. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 33, at 320.
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generalizing from either an overly broad data set (Congress’s general
interest in factfinding) or an overly narrow one (Congress’s interest in
factfinding when enacting a particular statute). Second (and more im-
portant), Congress’s institutional incentives to get the facts right may
be defined by subject area. For example, Congress may have different
incentives on, say, separation of powers than it does on affirmative
action. In this way, Justices who see the judicial role, first and fore-
most, as checking special-interest rent-seeking may well want to look
to such case studies in sorting out whether to embrace fact-dependent
standards or fact-insensitive rules. More to the point, as this part will
show, Congress sometimes gives short shrift to factfinding and, with
it, the public interest when legislation is the by-product of special-in-
terest preferences.
In providing a preliminary assessment of these matters, this part
will consider separation of powers, federalism, and affirmative action.
Through these case studies this part seeks to discover both when
Congress, in enacting legislation, does take a hard look at the facts
and when Congress seeks to amend or repeal legislation because it
comes to doubt the bill’s factual premises. In identifying whether
Congress has the institutional incentives to take factfinding seriously,
moreover, this part will offer some suggestions about how an empiri-
cally minded Court would apply the resulting incentives model.
A. Separation of Powers
The 1996 Line Item Veto Act (struck down by the Court)72 and
the Independent Counsel statute (upheld by the Court but killed by
the Congress)73 call attention to the circumstances in which Congress,
over time, is likely to get the facts right. In both cases, the institu-
tional self-interest of Congress and the President resulted in strong
incentives to keep these issues before Congress. Moreover, these in-
centives did not favor a particular political party or interest group.74
Finally, Congress was not seeking to expand its own power through
72. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421 (1998).
73. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696-97 (1988). Congress allowed the statute to expire
on June 30, 1999.
74. When Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act in April of 1996, for example, it was
unclear exactly which party would enjoy the new power—that is, a Democratic or Republican
President. In other words, Congress achieved agreement based on its inability to determine who
the institutional beneficiaries of the Act would be. See also infra notes 90-95 and accompanying
text (discussing party politics and the independent counsel).
DEVINS 04/24/01  1:43 PM
2001] CONGRESSIONAL FACTFINDING 1189
the enactment of either measure and, consequently, had little reason
to stand behind these measures if they proved unworkable.75
The 1996 Line Item Veto Act was premised on the belief that
omnibus appropriations had thrown off the balance of powers be-
tween Congress and the President.76 Nevertheless, by granting the
President power to rescind discretionary appropriations, opponents of
the measure warned that it would “take the appropriation process out
of [Congress] . . . and . . . transport it down to 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue.”77 When enacting the measure, however, Congress did not
know how the President would use the line-item veto. What it did
know was that, after the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, the
then-prevailing anti-incumbency sentiment made it impossible for
members to put their chances for reelection on the line by ignoring
charges that Congress’s fiscal irresponsibility jeopardized our nation’s
economic well-being.78 In other words, self-interest, not a detached
look at the pertinent facts, helps explain why both Democrats and
Republicans rallied behind the measure.
That self-interest figured prominently in the measure’s approval,
however, does not mean that Congress was poorly positioned to
monitor presidential implementation of the statute and, if need be,
correct its mistake. Most significantly, the Act was set to sunset in
75. Contrast, for example, the legislative veto struck down in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
959 (1983). Here, Congress may have seen the legislative veto as a low-cost way of
micromanaging executive branch implementation of the law and in this way, aggrandizing its
own power. For discussions of whether the legislative veto was used this way (or, alternatively,
whether the legislative veto, more than anything, sought to cabin broad delegations of legisla-
tive power), see Harold H. Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 207, 213-23 (1984) (calling attention to how the legislative veto reduces the costs of legisla-
tive decisionmaking); Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 275-92 (Autumn 1993) (detailing the history of the legislative veto and
suggesting that both Congress and the White House benefited from legislative vetoes).
76. According to line-item veto proponents, Congress backed the President into a corner
by waiting until the end of the fiscal year to enact one all-or-nothing omnibus appropriations (so
that a presidential veto would shut the government down). Consequently, when enacting the
Line Item Veto Act, Congress claimed that the line-item veto was a needed restoration of presi-
dential power. John McCain stated: “Given Congress’ predilection for unfunded and/or pork
barrel spending, omnibus spending bills, and continuing resolutions, it would seem only prudent
and constitutional to provide the President with functional veto power.” 141 CONG. REC. S101
(daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (statement of Sen. McCain).
77. 141 CONG. REC. H1090 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 1995) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski). For a
recounting of proponents’ and opponents’ arguments, see generally Neal E. Devins, In Search of
the Lost Chord: Reflections on the 1996 Item Veto Act, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1605 (1997).
78. In particular, with the failure of Gramm-Rudman and post-1990 budget summits to
check the national debt, Congress needed either to rely on politically costly mechanisms (in-
crease taxes, reduce spending) or find a new structural gimmick/approach.
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200579 and, consequently, the Act’s durability was tied to its continu-
ing appeal to Congress. Furthermore, the Act was sure to trigger nu-
merous “fire alarms,” for any time a special interest saw its favored
project rescinded, that interest would almost certainly complain to its
allies in Congress.80 The individual interests of members of Congress
and Congress’s institutional interest in preserving its budget priorities
were therefore likely to coalesce if the President made aggressive use
of the line-item veto.81
By striking down President Clinton’s first exercise of the line-
item veto, Congress’s claim that the line-item veto would restore, not
disrupt, the balance of powers was never put to the test.82 In light of
the above-identified incentives for Congress to monitor the Presi-
dent’s use of the line-item veto, an empirically minded Court might
have deferred a definitive ruling, allowing the line-item veto experi-
ment to continue by making use of a flexible fact-dependent standard
of review. 
In Clinton v. City of New York,83 however, the Justices divided six
to three on the question of whether the line-item veto violated the
constitutional command that the President veto (all, not part of) a bill
before (not after) it becomes law. By mooring its decision to a debat-
able interpretation of the constitutional text,84 the Court gave short
shrift to those institutional incentives that might well have guided an
79. Line Item Veto Act, Pub. L. 104-130, § 5, 110 Stat. 1200, 1212 (1996).
80. For this very reason, after the first few exercises of the line-item veto, legislators began
having second thoughts about their original support for the law. Lisa Hoffman Scrips, Clinton
Wields Line-Item Veto Lightly: Congress Piles Up 750 Pet Projects on Military Spending Bill;
President Kills Just 13 of Them, DENVER ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Oct. 15, 1997, at 32A.
81. Indeed, Congress had ways to insulate preferred constituents from the line-item veto.
For example, by identifying program priorities in unofficial and informal documents, Congress
could communicate its preferences to agencies without subjecting its handiwork to presidential
cancellations. Devins, supra note 77, at 1624. More significantly, the President had little incen-
tive to make use of his line-item veto power. In particular, since any rescinded appropriation
would go into a lockbox for budget deficits, Presidents could not shift funds (and thereby re-
ward political allies or constituent interests). For further discussion, see Terry M. Moe & Wil-
liam G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 143-48
(1999) (detailing how the individual interests of members of Congress often diverge from Con-
gress’s institutional interests).
82. In this way, the “facts” at issue in the line-item veto case were not truly knowable at the
time of the decision. In other words, unlike cases where Congress’s factfinding is based on a
judgment of the here and now, the line-item veto case—for an empirically minded Court—was
very much about the likelihood that Congress would revisit its handiwork over time.
83. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
84. For critiques of the Court’s reasoning, see generally Elizabeth Garrett, Accountability
and Restraint: The Federal Budget Process and the Line Item Veto Act, 20 CARDOZO L. REV.
871 (1999), and H. Jefferson Powell & Jed Rubenfeld, Laying It on the Line: A Dialogue on
Line Item Vetoes and Separation of Powers, 47 DUKE L.J. 1171 (1998).
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empirically minded Court. The Court’s 1988 decision in Morrison v.
Olson,85 upholding the Independent Counsel statute, is cut from an
entirely different cloth. There, the Court did employ a fact-dependent
standard of review.86 In so doing, the Court embraced a standard of
review consistent with the incentives model.87
The story of the Independent Counsel statute is, of course, tied
to Richard Nixon’s decision to fire Archibald Cox in the midst of the
Watergate scandal. In 1974 and again in 1976, voters retaliated
against Nixon loyalists, signaling that “support for post-Watergate re-
form was an electorally significant position to take.”88 Congress did
just that, creating a court-appointed Independent Counsel who, ab-
sent “extraordinary impropriety,” could not be removed by the At-
torney General.89
When enacting the statute, Congress could not anticipate how
Independent Counsel investigations would affect Justice Department
control of criminal investigations. Through a five-year sunset provi-
sion,90 however, Congress preserved its ability to bargain over the
terms of the statute (including the elimination of the Special Prosecu-
tor) with future presidents. For example, responding to Reagan ad-
ministration complaints, Congress, in 1983, increased the Attorney
General’s discretion in requesting a court-appointed Independent
Counsel,91 lowered the standard for removal to “good cause,”92 and
urged the Independent Counsel to follow Justice Department guide-
lines “except where not possible.”93
85. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
86. See id. at 679 (describing the Independent Counsel as “a temporary ‘office’ the nature
and duties of which will by necessity vary with the factual circumstances giving rise to the need
for an appointment in the first place”).
87. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the Court in Morrison explicitly took this in-
centives model into account. The Justices, for example, may have been reluctant to overturn a
statute designed to check post-Watergate executive branch abuses. For further discussion, see
infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court’s application of this fact-
dependent standard of review).
88. KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 51 (1992).
89. Pub. L. 95-521, § 601, 92 Stat. 1824, 1872 (1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 596) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
90. 28 U.S.C. § 599 (1994).
91. 28 U.S.C. § 592(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1994).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 594(f) (1994). In 1987, however, Congress responded to alleged abuses by
Attorney General Edwin Meese by limiting Attorney General discretion. HARRIGER, supra
note 88, at 77-89. In 1999, legislation was introduced to reform the Independent Counsel statute
by, among other things, narrowing the jurisdiction of Independent Counsel investigations. H.R.
117, 106th Cong. (1999).
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The Supreme Court was no doubt aware of this give-and-take
process when deciding the constitutional fate of the Independent
Counsel statute. What the Justices could not anticipate was Lawrence
Walsh’s six-year investigation of Iran-Contra or Kenneth Starr’s in-
vestigation of President Clinton, but these two investigations and,
with them, the apparent death of the Independent Counsel statute
point to the correctness of the result reached in Morrison.94 Like the
Line Item Veto Act, there was every reason to think that bargaining
between the branches would, over time, result in an equilibrium of
sorts—in this case, an Independent Counsel statute that did not un-
dermine Attorney General control or, alternatively, no Independent
Counsel statute at all. More to the point, presidents (and their allies
in Congress) were well-positioned to defend Department of Justice
interests. The Act’s sunset provision, for example, allowed the Presi-
dent to bargain with Congress over the statute (and, if need be, veto
the reauthorization). Furthermore, because Democratic and Republi-
can administrations would each be the target of Independent Counsel
investigations, the possibility that the statute would harm the political
fortunes of one but not the other party seemed doubtful.95 Conse-
quently, it is hardly surprising that, at the end of the day, the Justice
Department and Congress both agreed that the factual premises un-
derlying the statute were incorrect and that, for the time being at
least, it was better to have no statute than a fatally flawed one.96
The President and Congress, as the above discussion suggests,
have little choice but to react to and make accommodations with each
other. As a result, Congress seems especially likely to revisit its sepa-
ration of powers handiwork.97 In so doing, moreover, the President
94. It is important to keep in mind that, when reviewing Morrison, the D.C. Circuit had
overturned the Independent Counsel statute. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 517-18 (D.C. Cir.
1988). For this reason, the Supreme Court could not use its agenda control power to delay a de-
cision. For further discussion, see infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
95. Much the same can be said of the line-item veto. Democratic presidents would disap-
point Republicans by protecting Democratic-sponsored initiatives, and vice versa.
96. See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 243, 251 (1999) (statement of Attorney General Janet Reno)
(arguing that the Independent Counsel statute subverts Justice Department enforcement of the
criminal laws).
97. There are exceptions to this rule of thumb. Impeachment, for example, is an occasion
where members of Congress will not bargain with each other and the President over an ex-
tended period of time. For this reason, the built-in incentives of a repeat-player system are less
likely to be a factor. Perhaps for this reason, House Republicans gave short shift to factfinding
during the Clinton impeachment. In particular, relying on Special Counsel Starr’s report, the
House voted to send articles of impeachment to the Senate. The only independent factfinding
initiated by Republican leadership took place during the Senate trial (at a time when the im-
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may well have an opportunity to bargain with Congress over the
terms of power-sharing arrangements. For an empirically minded
Court, there is little reason to cut off this ongoing give-and-take proc-
ess by issuing rigid rules-based decisions. In particular, when Con-
gress and the President have both the incentives and the opportunity
to defend their institutional self-interest, it may well be that bargain-
ing between the branches will take into account the lessons of past
experience. Put another way: Why should an empirically minded
Court eschew facts (by imposing a fact-insensitive rule) when there is
ample reason to think that, over time, Congress and the President will
take the facts into account by moderating their handiwork. This, after
all, is what happened with the Independent Counsel statute and there
is ample reason to think that—had the Court not intervened—the
branches would have made accommodations to each other in imple-
menting the Line Item Veto Act. Consequently, in approaching sepa-
ration of powers issues, an empirically minded Court ought either to
employ fact-dependent standards of review and/or delay a definitive
decision by making use of certiorari denials and other forms of
agenda control.98 In this way, Congress and the President are given
breathing room to bargain with each other.99
peachment effort appeared doomed).
98. In some ways, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), follows this model. Assuming that
the Justices—based on decades of experience—thought that Congress was using the legislative
veto to micromanage executive branch implementation of the law, a decision striking down the
legislative veto, of course, makes sense. Moreover, by concluding that the legislative veto is in-
consistent with the Constitution’s text (a purely legal decision), the Court both made it difficult
for Congress to challenge its reasoning and preserved its option of making use of fact-dependent
standards in future cases. On the other hand, if the legislative veto was, more than anything, a
defensive measure that Congress utilized to protect its turf when delegating power to the execu-
tive, the Chadha decision inappropriately limited Congress from bargaining with the White
House over power-sharing arrangements. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing
different conceptualizations of the legislative veto).
99. More to the point, since Congress may well have the institutional incentives to take a
hard look at the facts underlying its enactments, there is little reason for an empirically minded
Court to make use of a rigid rule that cuts off a power-sharing arrangement before it is put into
effect. Specifically, since neither Congress nor the Court knows precisely how an untested
power-sharing arrangement will work, the Court has ample reason to give Congress the benefit
of the doubt in separation of powers cases. To do otherwise, an empirically minded Court, in
effect, would declare that Congress—contrary to what this case study suggests—cannot be
trusted in this area. For further discussion, see infra note 182 and accompanying text (explaining
how the Court may make use of “procedural minimalism” to facilitate ongoing bargaining be-
tween the branches).
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B. Federalism
Unlike the separation of powers issues, federalism concerns do
not provide incentives for Congress and the President, following judi-
cial approval of a statute, to bargain over its terms and, in so doing,
revisit its factual premises. Rather, the incentives of Congress and its
constituents are to expand the scope of federal power, not contract
that power in response to a “fire alarm” trigger. Consider, for exam-
ple, the minimal role played by United States v. Lopez100 in shaping
Congress’s views on federalism. By striking down legislation prohib-
iting firearm possession at or near a school,101 the Court signaled to
Congress that federalism concerns might play a significant role in
Court review of national legislation. Congress has not taken this mes-
sage to heart, however. The case is hardly referred to in legislative
deliberations102 and, more importantly, the Republican Congress (os-
tensibly committed to states’ rights) has increasingly federalized all
types of subjects.103
Congress’s expansionist tendencies are easily understood.104 First,
constituent interests increasingly see national legislation as preferable
to state and local measures. It is harder for regulated parties to avoid
national legislation and, as compared to lobbying fifty state legisla-
tures, there are fewer transaction costs associated with national legis-
100. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
101. Id. at 567-68.
102. From 1995 to 2000, Lopez was mentioned forty-nine times in the Congressional Record.
Twenty-seven of those references occurred in 1995 and 1996, a time when Congress responded
to Lopez by enacting a modified guns-in-the-schools ban—one requiring the federal govern-
ment to prove that the firearm either moved in interstate commerce or otherwise affected inter-
state commerce. LOUIS FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 90 (3d ed. 2000).
103. William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 141-44 (1998); Edwin Meese III, Big Brother on the Beat: The
Expanding Federalization of Crime, 1 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1, 4 (1997).
104. For excellent treatments of this subject, see Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82
MINN. L. REV. 317, 365-78 (1997) (describing the “centripetal forces” that account for the ten-
dency toward centralization of regulatory authority); Marshall, supra note 103, at 1440
(“[W]hether a matter will be federalized depends entirely upon its attractiveness, as a substan-
tive political issue, to federal officeholders. At best, the federalism argument will enter the de-
bate only as a secondary rhetorical point.”). For (I think incorrect) arguments that Congress is
attentive to the scope of its power vis-%-vis the states, see JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 175-80 (1980); Larry Kramer, Understanding Feder-
alism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 543 (1954). For a critique of those arguments, see William P. Marshall, Federalization:
A Critical Overview, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 719, 725-36 (1995).
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lation.105 Second, thanks both to changes in media coverage and mod-
ern political advertising, the political culture has become increasingly
nationalized.106 Third (and relatedly), voters expect lawmakers to
support politically popular legislation, not block it for a principle as
abstract as Congress’s failure to show—through factfinding—that the
measure addresses a national problem.107 “A lawmaker who voted
against the national Megan’s Law or the national car-jacking law, for
example, would almost certainly be characterized as being soft on
crime in her opponent’s next thirty-second sound bite.”108
Two examples, the Gun-Free School Zones Act109 (GFSZA) and
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act110 (RFRA), will illustrate why
Congress cannot be counted on to take factfinding seriously on feder-
alism questions. When enacting the GFSZA, Congress did not find
that gun possession affected interstate commerce, nor did any mem-
ber of Congress (or, for that matter, any witness at a House hearing
on the bill) suggest that interstate commerce was at issue.111 And why
should they? The tragedy of guns in schools was very real and politi-
cally popular.112 Also, when enacting the bill, the Supreme Court’s
105. Friedman, supra note 104, at 373-76; Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local
Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of
Federalism, 76 VA. L. REV. 265, 271-73 (1990). Also, a lobbyist who focuses her efforts on
Washington, D.C., travels less, hangs out with national power brokers, eats at better restaurants,
etc.
106. Marshall, supra note 103, at 151-53.
107. By analogy, states and local interests will only resist Congress’s expansionist tendencies
when something they value is on the line. Elizabeth Garrett, Enhancing the Political Safeguards
of Federalism? The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1113, 1128-31
(1996) (explaining why powerful interest groups, like the National League of Cities and the Na-
tional Association of Governors, who are ostensibly committed to “states’ rights” may fail to
guard the interests of federalism). When it comes to the federalization of crime, for example,
state governments have little interest in speaking up on behalf of criminal defendants. In con-
trast, state and local interests successfully fought off Clinton-era initiatives to expand the scope
of federal regulations over traditional boundaries of state and local authority. FISHER &
DEVINS, supra note 102, at 91-92.
108. Id. at 145.
109. The GFSZA was discussed and repudiated in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
110. The RFRA was discussed and repudiated in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507
(1997).
111. Barry Friedman, Legislative Findings and Judicial Signals: A Positive Political Reading
of United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 765-66 (1996). The issue was raised
indirectly, for one witness called attention to Congress’s failure to specify its constitutional
authority to enact the legislation. Id. at 766.
112. Congressional hearings and debates focused on tragic examples of gun violence in
schools. While the National Rifle Association submitted testimony opposing the legislation as
“a symbolic gesture,” “com[ing] only two months from the general elections,” Congress paid
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Commerce Clause jurisprudence did not require findings of fact and
was otherwise extremely deferential. With no powerful constituent
interest resisting the measure, there was much to lose and nothing to
gain by opposing this measure in order to sort out the facts.113 Ironi-
cally, after the Supreme Court decided to review a constitutional
challenge to the statute, Congress—recognizing that its handiwork
was on the line—quickly added an amendment to the bill, finding
(without hearings) that gun possession affected interstate com-
merce.114
The RFRA, an exercise of Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 5 enforcement powers, is an even more egregious example of
Congress’s willingness to trade off factfinding. To place the statute
within the ambit of Court precedent, Congress was advised to make
specific findings of fact “that formally neutral, generally applicable
laws have historically been instruments of religious persecution, that
enacting separate religious exemptions in every statute is not a work-
able means of protecting religious liberty, and that litigation about
governmental motives is not a workable means of protecting religious
liberty.”115 Instead, Congress’s consideration of the RFRA focused
exclusively on protesting the wrongness of Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith,116 a 1990 Su-
preme Court interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. Congres-
sional hearings showcased witnesses from religious and other interest
scant attention to claims that the GFSZA did little more than duplicate existing state statutes.
See Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 79 (1990) (statement of James Jay Baker, Director, NRA).
113. Anti-carjacking legislation is another example of Congress’s willingness to trade off
factfinding in order to do what is politically popular. When enacting the Anti Car Theft Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994)), Congress specifi-
cally found that car thefts were on the rise and, consequently, legislation was necessary to pro-
tect both “human life and . . . the economic well-being of the Nation.” Id. At that time, “the
media ha[d] seized upon joyriding and . . . [u]sing the common links of cars and stereotypes, the
media ha[d] created the impression of an epidemic of out-of-control young Black men engaging
in auto theft.” Dwight L. Grene, Naughty by Nature: Black Male Joyriding—Is Everything
Gonna Be Alright?, 4 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 73, 75 (1994). What the media did not report
was that car theft, in fact, was on the decline. Id. at 76 n.10. Notwithstanding this false premise,
interest groups, both when the legislation was enacted and in subsequent years, never triggered
a “fire alarm,” and, consequently, Congress never reconsidered its findings. For further discus-
sion, see Rogovin, supra note 38, at 1772-78.
114. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994).
115. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Sub-
comm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 331
(1992) (statement of Professor Douglas Laycock).
116. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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groups, nearly all of whom attacked Smith.117 Lawmakers read from a
nearly identical script, routinely condemning Smith and calling upon
the Justices to reverse it.118 In the end, with virtually no interest group
opposition to the measure, Congress gave short shrift to factfinding in
order to do precisely what RFRA’s interest group sponsors asked for,
that is, repudiate Smith.
The lesson of the GFSZA and the RFRA is simple. Congress
finds facts when there is a reason to do so. If the Court, for example,
were to precondition approval of legislation on formalized factfind-
ing, Congress almost certainly would comply. Such factfinding might
well be boilerplate, however, for interest groups and congressional
sponsors would see formalized findings as essential to the enter-
prise.119 On occasion, however, the convergence of interest group and
party leader preferences demand that Congress take factfinding seri-
ously. The 1964 Civil Rights Act is an example of this phenomenon.
Here, there was formidable resistance to grounding the Act’s public
accommodation provision in the Commerce Clause; while Southern
lawmakers opposed the Act altogether, some Republican Party lead-
ers wanted to ground the Act in the Fourteenth Amendment.120 In re-
sponse, Act sponsors in Congress, as well as Kennedy administration
officials, worked overtime—sometimes by arguing the facts, some-
times by amassing a broad array of interest group supporters of the
Act—in convincing lawmakers that the statute did implicate interstate
commerce.121
While Congress certainly did a yeoman’s job of documenting the
nexus between private discrimination and interstate commerce,122
there is a certain irony in heralding the 1964 Act as a model of legisla-
tive factfinding. Act sponsors sought to manipulate the process in
ways that point to the value-laden nature of legislative factfinding. In
117. For a review of the RFRA’s legislative history, see Devins, supra note 58, at 651-56.
118. Lawmakers also applauded the unprecedented coalition of interest groups that came
together in support of the RFRA. Id. at 652-53.
119. Harold J. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agency: The Propriety of Requiring Legisla-
tive Findings, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731, 735-36 (1996) (arguing that the main effect of Lo-
pez will be the loading of statutes with boilerplate findings); H. Jefferson Powell, Enumerated
Means and Unlimited Ends, 94 MICH. L. REV. 651, 651-52 (1995) (same).
120. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 87-95 (1990).
121. Id. at 90-94.
122. The Senate Commerce Committee held twenty-three separate sessions on the measure;
a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee spent twenty-two days in hearings and an-
other seventeen in executive session on the measure. Mark E. Herrmann, Note, Looking Down
from the Hill: Factors Determining the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme
Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 571-72 (1992).
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particular, with southerner James Eastland chairing the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, an arrangement was worked out whereby the Sen-
ate Commerce Committee (“loaded [with members] in favor” of pub-
lic accommodations) would have jurisdiction over this part of the
Act.123 In this way, the story of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is mixed. On
the one hand, Congress made use of its ample resources to find facts
and, given opposition to the bill, did so in a highly credible way. On
the other hand, by choreographing this effort to reach a particular
conclusion, the 1964 Civil Rights Act also points to the dangers of
looking to Congress to limit the scope of its federalism-implicated
powers by taking factfinding seriously.
Finally, on federalism matters, there is little incentive for Con-
gress to reconsider its handiwork. On issues as diverse as guns in
schools, religious liberty protections, and civil rights, it is doubtful
(once the coalition supporting the bill is sufficiently strong to push it
through Congress) that an interest group will be able to trigger a “fire
alarm” calling the bill into question. Even if an alarm is triggered, it
might well take a sea change in attitudes to form a coalition suffi-
ciently strong to convince both lawmakers and the President to dis-
rupt the expectation interests of the coalition supporting the original
bill.124
How then should an empirically minded Court approach feder-
alism-related issues? To start with, there is a great cost in embracing
fact-dependent standards. In particular, after holding (in 1937) that
Congress’s power to regulate commerce extends to anything and eve-
rything “affecting commerce,”125 the Court encouraged Congress to
make findings that commerce indeed was affected, findings that the
Court could not challenge (or at least could not challenge without ap-
123. GRAHAM, supra note 120, at 93-94.
124. Once a measure is approved, an “endowment effect” is created whereby beneficiaries
feel a sense of entitlement so strong that the costs of changing the status quo are especially high.
Langevoort, supra note 46, at 1517 (“[H]aving an existing property interest creates a greater
attachment . . . than would be expressed by others not in possession . . . .”). Furthermore, on
federalism matters, Congress has little incentive to police itself in ways that constrain its power.
Consider, for example, unfunded mandates reform, one of the centerpieces of the Contract with
America. Legislation was enacted, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4,
109 Stat. 48, but it did not end unfunded mandates. Many of the mandates concerning civil
rights, the disabled, and other categories are specifically exempted. Id. For the mandates that
are covered, the statute merely requires the Congressional Budget Office to flag any bill that
creates an unfunded mandate of $50 million or higher on the states. Id. But see WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 180 (2000) (noting
that the Act is more than symbolic politics, for any member of Congress can force consideration
of unfunded mandates and, in this way, compel lawmakers to deliberate over federalism values).
125. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1937).
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pearing to act as a super-legislature).126 For this very reason, Justice
Robert Jackson, after authoring Wickard v. Filburn,127 lamented, “I
really know of no place where we can bound the doctrine.”128 An em-
pirically minded Court, given Congress’s expansionist tendencies,
would never have embraced this open-ended, fact-dependent “af-
fecting commerce” standard. Given that interest groups grow in
power and number over time,129 an empirically minded Court would
have feared that a fact-dependent standard would accomplish little
more than the advantaging of special interests at the expense of the
public interest. At the same time, once the New Deal Court let the
“affecting commerce” genie out of the bottle,130 an empirically minded
Court might well make use of boundary control standards that would
deem some federalism-related issues to be questions of law, not
fact.131
126. For a somewhat competing perspective, see Frickey, supra note 21, at 711-12. For
Frickey, judicial acceptance of an integrated national economy did not come with Jones &
Laughlin in 1937; instead, Jones & Laughlin speaks to Congress’s “sustained and increasingly
thoughtful” showing that there was, in fact, an integrated national economy. Id. Under this
view, the Court exercised some caution before Wickard, a case where the Court’s embrace of a
pro-Congress standard was unquestionable. At the same time, by placing great emphasis on
congressional factfinding in Jones & Laughlin, the Justices, undoubtedly, placed the ball in
Congress’s court, for once Congress found facts, it would be very difficult for the Court to
meaningfully check Congress.
127. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding the power of the government to count a farmer’s pri-
vate consumption of wheat as part of a government-prescribed quota).
128. Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1089, 1145 (2000) (quoting a letter Justice Jackson sent to his friend (and later As-
sociate Justice) Sherman Minton).
129. MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 40 (1982) (charting the growth
of interest groups).
130. It may be, of course, that a desire to uphold post–New Deal exercises of the commerce
power may have made the “affecting commerce” standard irresistible. See generally WILLIAM E.
LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN (1995) (arguing that the Court’s expansive
approach to the Commerce Clause was a by-product of political pressures, including FDR’s
Court-packing plan). For a competing perspective, see generally Barry Cushman, Rethinking the
New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 201 (1994).
131. This is precisely what happened in both the Gun-Free School Zones and Violence
Against Women Act cases. Declaring that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is limited to
“the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce,” the Court con-
cluded that congressional factfinding was irrelevant. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
617 (2000) (rejecting the argument “that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct” and, in so doing, deeming irrelevant legislative factfinding pointing to “that conduct’s
aggregate effect on interstate commerce”); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551, 560, 567
(1995) (suggesting that—no matter what findings Congress may make—gun possession is not
“economic activity” and, as such, cannot “substantially affect any sort of interstate commerce”).
For this reason, I think that Bryant and Simeone are wrong to suggest that Lopez and Morrison
are inconsistent with the traditionalist law-fact divide. Bryant & Simeone, supra note 4, at 339-
44. With that said, I do not mean to suggest that the Court followed the incentives model that I
am laying out in this Essay. But a Court following this model, given the constraints of precedent,
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What then of the RFRA? Here, Congress was acting on its Sec-
tion 5 enforcement powers, but, as when it legislates pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers, there is reason to think that special-
interest politics, not factfinding in the public interest, dominated con-
gressional decisionmaking. For this reason, an empirically minded
Court might well embrace standards, such as the one utilized in City
of Boerne v. Flores,132 that allow the Justices to toss aside legislative
action taken under the enforcement powers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, perceived to be about rights (law), rather than remedies
(facts).133
C. Affirmative Action
Affirmative action legislation, like legislation that expands Con-
gress’s federalism-implicated powers, reinforces the secondary role
that factfinding plays in legislative deliberations. Here, the power of
committees, the intensity of preferences among constituents and, cor-
respondingly, the members who represent them, and Congress’s reac-
tive nature are on full display. As when they legislate on federalism-
related issues, moreover, there are few incentives for members of
Congress to reconsider preexisting affirmative action programs. Con-
gress’s longstanding approval of both set-asides for minority business
enterprises and diversity preferences for minority broadcasters illus-
trate these points.134
Set-aside provisions of the Public Works Employment Act of
1977135 and the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982136 high-
light the pivotal role that interest group preferences, not factfinding,
play in affirmative action legislation. Congress, in enacting these
might well have chosen the same course.
132. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
133. Recent Supreme Court decisions on the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as age
discrimination and patients rights legislation, support this conclusion. See supra note 19. By al-
lowing the Justices to review congressional factfinding in sorting out whether the matter before
them is one of law or facts, the City of Boerne standard maximizes judicial discretion. See supra
note 18 and accompanying text; infra note 162 and accompanying text.
134. I do not mean to suggest that I oppose affirmative action or that a factual basis does not
exist for these programs. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a
Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L. REV. 125, 150-55 (1990) (defending the constitutionality of remedial
preferences).
135. Pub. L. No. 95-28, 91 Stat. 116 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6710 (1994)) (upheld in
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)).
136. The provision first appeared in 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-424, 96 Stat. 2097 (1983) (codified
at 23 U.S.C. § 101 (1994), 49 U.S.C. § 1602 (1994)), and has been reenacted several times, most
recently in 1998.
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measures, made no formal findings of fact, nor did it hold hearings.137
Instead, by way of floor amendments added to larger public works
bills, Congress, with virtually no debate, approved these set-aside
programs.138 The simple explanation for this expedited consideration
is logrolling; in particular, members of the Congressional Black Cau-
cus, quite rightly, wanted to “get a fair share of the action” from these
public works measures.139
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,140 however, the Supreme Court em-
braced traditionalist notions of Congress’s superior factfinding skills
when upholding the 1977 Public Works Act set-aside. Deeming the
Act “a considered decision of the Congress”141 and, on occasion, em-
ploying the analytical rigor of rational basis review,142 Fullilove is a
paean to Congress.143 An empirically minded Court would have
steered clear of such deferential fact-dependent decisionmaking;
rather, fearful that such a standard might limit its power to check
race-based special-interest politics, empirically minded Justices, at a
minimum, would have wanted to defer judgment on what standard to
employ in affirmative action cases until they knew more about the
politics underlying these measures.144
Diversity preferences in broadcasting, upheld by the Supreme
Court in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,145 are another example to
137. For an accounting of the legislative history, see Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 YALE
L.J. 453, 465-66, 471-73 (1987).
138. Consider, for example, the Public Works Act set-aside. The House and Senate each
approved the provision the same day that it was proposed. 123 CONG. REC. H5332 (1977); id. at
S7156.
139. 123 CONG. REC. 5327 (1977) (statement of Rep. Mitchell). And while many in Con-
gress may have seen these measures as necessary to remedy discrimination, Congress’s deci-
sionmaking processes suggest otherwise. Days, supra note 137, at 465-66 (noting that, unlike
most civil rights laws, “the minority set-aside provision was enacted into law without hearings or
committee reports, and with only token opposition”).
140. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
141. Id. at 473.
142. Id. at 485 (noting “the well-established concept that a legislature may take one step at a
time to remedy only part of a broader problem”).
143. Indeed, since it could not say much about the legislative history of the 1977 set-aside,
the decision is replete with references to congressional and agency factfinding of an affirmative
action program that was not before the Court. Id. at 463-72; see also Days, supra note 137, at
463-77 (criticizing this practice).
144. For example, because Congress may take into account both earlier factfinding and in-
formation learned outside of the legislative process, it would be wrong for the Court to assume
the worst about Congress simply because a measure was enacted without much debate or formal
factfinding. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-04 (Powell, J., concurring) (distinguishing legislative
from judicial factfinding).
145. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), rev’d, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
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which an empirically minded Justice could look in sorting out the
politics underlying preference programs. Here, like the 1977 set-aside,
power politics, not factfinding, explains Congress’s role in defending
FCC diversity preferences. Unlike set-asides, however, Congress
played a largely reactive role, battling a Reagan FCC hell-bent on
eviscerating race preferences.146 Prior to 1985, the question of whether
the granting of preferences to minority broadcasters increased the di-
versity of programming and viewpoint was of little, if any, interest to
Congress.147 That year, however, the Commission called into question
the constitutionality of FCC initiatives that used race preferences to
increase program diversity.148 Congress, principally through the House
Energy and Commerce Committee, responded with a vengeance.
Hearings were held castigating all five FCC Commissioners for their
failure to honor congressional preferences, and legislation was passed
prohibiting the FCC from reexamining its diversity preference initia-
tives.149 That the Congress had never enacted legislation mandating
diversity preferences did not matter. It also did not matter that the
Commission did not propose repealing their diversity preferences but,
instead, proposed engaging in factfinding to see if there was a nexus
between race preferences and program diversity.150 What did matter is
that Congress wanted to preserve these race preferences, and if pre-
venting Commission factfinding was the most expedient way to get to
the answer “yes,” so be it.151
146. Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 169-80 (Autumn 1993) (detailing President Reagan’s opposition to the
FCC’s “fairness doctrine” on the grounds the doctrine was “antagonistic to the freedom of ex-
pression guaranteed by the First Amendment”).
147. In 1981 and 1982, however, Congress did find that race discrimination was the cause of
minority underrepresentation in broadcasting. These findings were part of a legislative scheme
permitting (but not requiring) the FCC to grant licenses through a lottery weighted in favor of
minority interests. See H.R. REP. NO. 765, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1982).
148. In the midst of litigation over the constitutionality of gender preferences, the Commis-
sion in September 1986 filed a brief contending that its use of race and gender preferences “con-
flicts with constitutional standards” and that it needed to sort out whether a nexus existed be-
tween its preference scheme and an enhanced diversity of programming. Brief for the Federal
Communications Commission on Rehearing En Banc at 22-23, Steele v. FCC, 770 F.2d 1192
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
149. Devins, supra note 146, at 169-80 (detailing this history of race preferences by the FCC,
Congress, and the judiciary).
150. Congress, moreover, paid no mind to the fact that it had created the FCC for the very
purpose of sorting out how best to advance the public interest on broadcasting-related issues.
151. Unlike legislation mandating diversity preferences (requiring the approval of both
houses of Congress and the President), Congress could move more quickly and more efficiently
by attaching a limitations rider prohibiting FCC reconsideration to an appropriations bill. See
generally Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders, 1987
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That Congress did what it did was entirely predictable and, con-
sidering the circumstances, quite defensible. At that time, the FCC
and the Energy and Commerce Committee were locked in a bitter
fight over the propriety of government regulation of broadcasting.152
The Commission embraced market-driven solutions, suggesting to
Congress that FCC factfinding would simply put into place a preor-
dained conclusion. In other words, Congress was not simply defend-
ing civil rights interests; it was defending its own turf.153 Further fuel-
ing this fire, Energy and Commerce is one of the House’s power
committees, and its then-Chair, John Dingell (D-MI), was especially
interested in exerting influence over government agencies and pro-
grams.154 Consequently, rather than “‘getting bogged down in fruitless
debates’” over the Commission’s legal arguments, “‘Energy and
Commerce members move[d] quickly to fix the problems before
them.’”155 In other words, factfinding had no salience to the Commit-
tee, for the best way to block the FCC was to block factfinding.
The question of whether Congress, over time, has the institu-
tional incentives to examine the factual premises of diversity prefer-
ences still remains. After all, it is to be expected that a Democratic
Congress would simultaneously defend its turf and respond to a “fire
alarm” triggered by a loyal, powerful constituent.156 Over the past six
years, however, the Republican leadership in Congress has done its
DUKE L.J. 456 (criticizing Congress’s use of the appropriations process for substantive policy-
making).
152. In particular, the Committee fought tooth-and-nail to block FCC efforts to repeal the
fairness doctrine as well as limitations on the ownership of both newspapers and television sta-
tions in the same market. Devins, supra note 146, at 159-61.
153. For this reason, Committee condemnation of the FCC was, to put it mildly, vitriolic.
Congressman John Bryant characterized it as “almost pointless” to work with the Commission;
Congressman Micky Leland referred to the need to draft “FCC-proof legislation”; and Con-
gressman Edward Markey labeled the FCC reexamination of diversity preferences “a cloud-
burst in a storm of suspicion and distrust which seems to hover over the Commission.” Minority-
Owned Broadcast Stations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 31, 20, 22
(1986) [hereinafter Hearings].
154. Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3 SETON
HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 327-36 (1993) (comparing the Energy & Commerce Committee to the
more deliberative Judiciary Committee).
155. Id. at 345 (quoting an interview with a Committee staffer); see also Hearings, supra
note 153, at 53-55 (statement of Rep. Al Swift) (bemoaning the FCC’s “legalistic gobbledy-
gook” and remaking that “I am not a lawyer, and I am mystified by them all the time”).
156. The overwhelming majority of African Americans are Democrats. Moreover, for
members of the Congressional Black Caucus, affirmative action ranks at the very top of their
legislative agenda.
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best to steer clear of the affirmative action wars.157 Worried about
“[t]he danger[] that our [party’s] aspirations and intentions will be
misperceived, dividing our country and harming our party,”158 Repub-
licans in Congress appear unprepared to take a hard look at the fac-
tual premises of various affirmative action programs.159
By making the winning of elections and the forging of coalitions
their first priority, Republican leaders are simply doing what comes
naturally. Today, the costs of affirmative action are spread through-
out the nonminority population, so that there is little incentive for
voters (or other powerful interests) to rally behind candidates who
oppose affirmative action.160 In contrast, minority interests in Con-
gress (and their supporters) care passionately about affirmative ac-
tion. In other words, this may be an issue where “discrete and insular
minorities” have disproportionate influence in the political process.161
Unlike the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the political forces pushing Con-
157. FCC diversity preferences, for the most part, remain in force. Alan J. Meese, Bakke
Betrayed, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 479, 487-93 (Winter/Spring 2000) (arguing that the
Clinton administration misapplied Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke to justify racial preferences
in broadcasting). More striking, Congress continues to reauthorize public works set-asides.
James Dao, $200 Billion Bill for Public Works Passed by Congress, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1998,
at A1.
158. 144 CONG. REC. S1481, 1490 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 1998) (statement of Sen. John McCain).
The fact that the Supreme Court, in Adarand Constructors, signaled its skepticism of federal
affirmative action has not changed Congress’s affirmative action calculus. Neal Devins, The
Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1985-87 (1999) (discussing Congress’s
bipartisan support of affirmative action in the wake of Adarand).
159. I do not mean to suggest that affirmative action will not be the subject of congressional
inquiries. Congress, for example, did modify set-aside legislation in 1987 to take account of scam
firms benefiting under the program. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance
Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-17, § 106, 101 Stat. 132, 144 (1987). During the 1990s, moreover,
John Ashcroft (R-MO), Charles Canaday (R-FL), and others sponsored hearings questioning
the propriety of affirmative action. See, e.g., Unconstitutional Set-Asides: ISTEA’s Race-Based
Set-Asides After Adarand: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
(1997). And, following the 1994 Republican takeover of Congress, appropriation riders forbid-
ding FCC reconsideration of diversity preferences were not reenacted (a largely symbolic ges-
ture since the Clinton FCC strongly backed these initiatives). Over time, it may be that affirma-
tive action opponents convince a significant portion of the voting public to make preferences a
litmus test issue. If that happens, Congress may take a hard look at existing programs. For ex-
ample, because public works preferences must be reenacted every five years, Congress will have
ample opportunity to reconsider the sensibility of these preferences. In this way, by making use
of sunset provisions, Congress signals its interest in reexamining the factual premises of legisla-
tion. Of course, Congress’s willingness to reconsider its handiwork is, ultimately, a by-product of
constituent and other interests triggering a “fire alarm.” See supra notes 64-67 and accompany-
ing text (describing “fire alarm” triggers), 90-93 and accompanying text (suggesting that sunset
provisions encourage Congress’s reconsideration of its separation of powers handiwork).
160. In fact, big business typically supports affirmative action, for its costs disproportion-
ately fall on smaller, less powerful business interests.
161. For the definitive treatment of this issue, see generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
DEVINS 04/24/01  1:43 PM
2001] CONGRESSIONAL FACTFINDING 1205
gress to take factfinding seriously have not emerged on affirmative
action.162
It is for this very reason that the Supreme Court erred in Metro
Broadcasting. By employing intermediate scrutiny, a highly malleable
fact-dependent standard of review, the Justices placed great emphasis
on “Congress’ institutional competence as the National Legislature”
and, with it, the “appropriate deference [owed] to Congress.”163 In this
way, the Justices paved the way for Congress to see race preferences
as a type of spoils system, something that could be used to respond to
interest group pressures, rather than something that serves the public
interest. An empirically minded Court, in contrast, would have
wanted to signal Congress that it would look skeptically at legislative
factfinding intended to prop up the policy preferences of special in-
terests. For example, by employing strict scrutiny review,164 the Court
could declare—as a matter of law—that certain governmental pur-
poses are insufficient to support race preferences,165 thus allowing the
Court to police race preferences without absorbing the legitimacy
costs of second-guessing legislative factfinding.166
162. For similar reasons, affirmative action can be distinguished from voting rights legisla-
tion, especially the 1965 Voting Rights Act, 79 Stat. 437 (1965). To overcome southern resis-
tance to the 1965 Act, Congress needed a strong factual record to support its handiwork.
GRAHAM, supra note 120, at 162-73 (detailing the history of the 1965 Act). By 1982, when Con-
gress amended the statute, things had changed. In part, Congress wanted to distance itself from
Reagan administration efforts to grant tax breaks to racist schools. Also in part, no set of power-
ful interests stood in the way of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, an amalgamation of
165 civil rights groups. See generally ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 79-
136 (1987) (describing the politics of legislative passage in the House and the liberal power in a
conservative Senate). Consequently, when the House held hearings on the bill, no witnesses op-
posed to the bill were called to counter representatives from numerous civil rights groups. Id. at
83-86 (quoting Thomas Boyd, Republican minority counsel, as saying “the only critics were
supposed to come from us, and we didn’t want to call them because we weren’t really critical of
the act, only certain provisions, and didn’t want to be perceived as against the act”).
163. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563 (1990).
164. In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the Supreme Court rejected
the “lenient standard” of Metro Broadcasting, replacing it with strict scrutiny review. Id. at 236.
In so doing, however, the Court said nothing at all about the concerns of legislative factfinding
and special-interest capture that animate this Essay.
165. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986), for example, the Court
concluded that—as a matter of law—a school board did not have a compelling interest either in
remedying societal discrimination or in providing minority role models for its minority students.
Id. at 276.
166. The Justices, of course, could also embrace a hard rule, namely, that any and all race
preferences are unconstitutional as a matter of law. This type of rule, however, would deny
Congress the power to demonstrate—through factfinding in the public interest—the necessity of
some race preference programs.
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D. Summary
The question of whether courts or lawmakers will do a better job
of uncovering social facts is highly contextual. Congress is better posi-
tioned to find social facts, but it is far from clear that Congress has the
incentives to make full use of its superior factfinding resources. In
particular, as the above discussion makes clear, Congress does what it
needs to do to advance the interests of voters, interest groups, and
party leaders.167 Factfinding sometimes fits into this equation, but of-
ten it does not. It is for this very reason that the Supreme Court must
exercise great care before embracing fact-dependent standards of re-
view. In particular, unless the Justices are willing to overturn these
decisions,168 the selection of a fact-dependent standard may well limit
the Court in its ability to check Congress from rewarding special in-
terests. If the checking of special interests is a principal objective of
the Constitution and, with it, judicial review of legislative decision-
making, the Court should limit its embrace of fact-dependent stan-
dards of review to those circumstances where Congress has the incen-
tives to serve the public interest, and, by extension, to get the facts
right in the first instance or to correct its mistakes over time.
IV.  CONCLUSION: AN EMPIRICALLY INFORMED CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE?
The possibility of an empirically informed jurisprudence is
premised on the belief that either Congress or the Supreme Court has
both the willingness and the capacity to understand social facts. By
calling attention to significant roadblocks standing in the way of both
congressional and judicial factfinding, however, this Essay under-
scores how problematic and difficult it is for the Court to craft stan-
167. I am not suggesting that Congress is not at all motivated by the public interest. But
Congress’s understanding of the public interest is shaped by these constituents.
168. Sometimes, the costs of overturning a decision are so high that the Court will almost
certainly adhere to a decision whose factual premises no longer seem correct. Consider, for ex-
ample, Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Here, there was little prospect of the Court over-
turning itself and declaring the Independent Counsel statute unconstitutional. In particular,
since Congress and the President have to sign off on the statute every five years, the Justices
would find it especially difficult to say that, contrary to their holding in Morrison, the Independ-
ent Counsel statute disrupts the balance of powers. Not only would such a declaration fly in the
face of the statute’s continuing approval by Congress and the White House, the occasion in
which the Court would consider overruling the statute would, by definition, be politically
charged. After all, Independent Counsel investigations are limited to the President and other
high ranking executive officials. For further discussion, see infra notes 180-81 and accompanying
text.
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dards of review that take into account the comparative strengths and
weaknesses of congressional and judicial factfinding. In sorting out
how the Supreme Court should navigate its way around these road-
blocks, I have suggested that the Justices should take factfinding seri-
ously and adopt fact-dependent standards only when Congress has
the institutional incentives to accurately perform this function.
Moreover, as I will now argue, the Court should look at ways it can
facilitate factfinding by both Congress and itself.
In this concluding part, additional details about the workings of
this incentives model will be revealed. Before turning to some of the
things that an empirically minded Court can do, let me dismiss some
untenable possibilities, namely: a prophylactic rule favoring either
Congress or the Court, due process in lawmaking, and judicial mini-
malism. For quite obvious reasons, there is nothing to commend a
rule whereby the Court assumes that Congress takes factfinding seri-
ously and, consequently, any and all legislative enactments are em-
pirically grounded (whether or not Congress held hearings, made
findings, etc.).169 Unless and until Congress has reason to make good
use of its superior factfinding skills, it is hard to see how such a rule
would accomplish anything—other than to further diminish Con-
gress’s interest in factfinding.
A prophylactic rule favoring the Court is at least as untenable.
To embrace a standard of review that would make it, not Congress,
supreme in the finding of social facts, the Justices would have to show
both that Congress cannot perform its constitutional duties and that
the Court is well-positioned to assume the role of factfinding czar.170
Inherent limits in judicial factfinding, the tendency for Justices to
169. Outside of deferential rational basis review, the Court, on occasion, employs this
model. E.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 199-202 (1997) (“Though the dissent
criticizes our reliance on evidence provided to Congress . . . that argument displays a lack of re-
gard for Congress’ factfinding function . . . . The Constitution gives to Congress the role of
weighing conflicting evidence in the legislative process.”); Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S.
547, 572 (1990) (“We would be remiss . . . if we ignored the long history of congressional support
for these policies . . . because . . . Congress has consistently recognized the barriers encountered
by minorities . . . .”); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 502-03 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“Congress is not an adjudicatory body called upon to resolve specific disputes between com-
peting adversaries. Its constitutional role is to be representative rather than impartial, to make
policy rather than apply settled principles of law.”).
170. In other words, “justifying an expansion of judicial review requires more than a demon-
stration that the political process often produces defective outcomes. It requires a demonstra-
tion that expanding the realm of judicial decisionmaking would reduce the possibility of defec-
tive outcomes.” Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 67; see also KOMESAR, supra note 68, at 138-50 (comparing courts
and lawmakers).
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follow the lead of the political party that appoints them, and the need
for the Court to secure support for its rulings from elected officials
stand in the way of such a radical departure from the traditionalist
view that—consistent with the separation of powers—deference is
owed Congress’s factfinding.
Due process in lawmaking stands on much firmer footing, for it is
largely grounded in the real world. Recognizing Congress’s disinterest
in exploring the empirical foundations of its handiwork, due process
in lawmaking is seen as a way of encouraging Congress to take fact-
finding seriously. Courts, for example, can make use of a constitu-
tional interpretive canon that would condition judicial approval of
legislation to the procedures that Congress employs when enacting a
bill.171 By encouraging Congress to find facts, hold hearings, and for-
mally tie their factfinding to the evidence they gather, due process in
lawmaking stands as a means of ensuring that Congress is taking fact-
finding seriously.
Two insurmountable hurdles, however, stand in the way of such
an approach. First, if Congress is acting at the behest of special inter-
ests, any such factfinding is likely to be boilerplate. Committee chairs
can ask members of their staffs or the bill’s interest group sponsors to
sort out the measure’s factual underpinnings. And while “judges on
review can ensure that factfinding be based on empirical evidence,
enterprising staffers should be able to surmount any such obstacle.”172
Second, courts cannot set manageable standards to overcome the
problem of boilerplate factfinding.173 How, for example, can a court
171. Frickey, supra note 21, at 710-11 (focusing on how Congress’s factual findings can re-
spond to judicial concerns and noting that even extensive social facts cannot overcome a judicial
limitation on congressional power, so that the Court must strike down ultra vires legislation or
modify the standard for assessing legislation); Friedman, supra note 111, at 758 (agreeing with
Frickey that after Lopez, Congress should articulate the relevant judicial standard and then de-
velop facts to show that the legislation in question satisfies that standard).
172. Krent, supra note 119, at 735 (noting that it is feasible for Congress to demonstrate the
factual underpinnings of federal regulation to courts’ satisfaction by assigning staff to research
issues and provide empirical evidence on which Congress may base its factfinding); supra notes
56-59 and accompanying text (noting that staffers may pad legislative history and, consequently,
courts should be cautious about looking at such history in discerning legislative intent); see also
Vicki L. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2180, 2240 (1998) (suggesting that the Court impose upon Congress a “process-based
‘clear evidence/clear statement’” requirement when Congress regulates in ways “not obviously
within an enumerated power”).
173. Likewise, courts are constrained in that Congress sometimes finds facts without creat-
ing a record. Justice Lewis Powell put it this way:
Congress [unlike a court or administrative agency] has no responsibility to confine its
vision to the facts and evidence adduced by particular parties. Instead, its special at-
tribute as a legislative body lies in its broader mission to investigate and consider all
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tell if a witness list at a hearing is skewed, or whether a bill is fairly
debated? How can it tell whether members of Congress are reason-
able in their assessment of social science research, the credibility of
witnesses, so on and so forth? The answers to these questions are
value-laden, requiring the court to substitute its judgment for that of
Congress. In other words, due process applied to lawmaking cannot
be penetrating without undermining its principal virtue, that is,
avoiding the pitfalls of judge-made lawmaking.
Judicial minimalism offers a way around these problems but cre-
ates new problems of its own. By issuing minimalist opinions that
would allow the Justices to revisit an issue without overruling them-
selves, the Court need not reach a definitive judgment on the quality
of congressional factfinding.174 Relatedly, by issuing a minimalist deci-
sion, the Court can also sidestep the question of whether it should
substitute its factfinding for that of Congress. The problem, however,
is that, over time, a minimalist Court will never get around to settling
on a standard of review either validating or minimizing congressional
factfinding.175 In this way, a minimalist Court, ultimately, is uncon-
cerned with Congress’s interest in getting the facts right.
What then can the Supreme Court do both in assessing the qual-
ity of legislative factfinding and in encouraging Congress to take fact-
finding more seriously?176 In particular, how can the Justices put into
effect the incentives model that this Essay champions? To start with,
rather than speculate on Congress’s interest in factfinding (and, more
generally, whether Congress is acting in the public interest, not simply
facts and opinions that may be relevant to the resolution of an issue.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-03 (Powell, J., concurring). In other words, due process in lawmaking
does not take into account how legislative and adjudicatory factfinding are inherently different.
174. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 4-5 (1999). Limitations in judicial factfinding (including the Court’s power to assess leg-
islative factfinding) are but one ingredient in the mix of factors that Sunstein cites in support of
his proposal.
175. Moreover, judicial minimalism undermines the Court’s power to speak forcefully about
the Constitution’s meaning and, as such, denies the Court a coequal role in shaping constitu-
tional values. Devins, supra note 158, at 1990-91; see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the
New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1454, 1458 (2000) (rejecting current arguments
for judicial minimalism, which focus on the judiciary’s role in bolstering the accountability of
other political institutions, in favor of a “juricentric minimalism” that emphasizes the legitimacy
of the adjudicative process and the judiciary’s ability to protect individual rights).
176. On the importance of devising strategies that encourage Congress to perform its insti-
tutional duties, see John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 879 (1991) (con-
tending that “[h]elping devise such judicial Congress-prodding doctrines thus seems to me the
most productive use that can currently be made of a constitutional scholar’s time”).
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promoting special interests),177 the Justices can make use of the “pas-
sive virtues,” that is, procedural and jurisdictional delays that provide
“a time lag between legislation and adjudication.”178 In so doing, the
Court (as well as the litigants and amici who inform the Justices
through their filings) can gain a better appreciation of the relevant
social facts. By looking to Congress’s interest in overseeing the im-
plementation of the law, its decisionmaking on related issues, and the
decisionmaking of several lower courts, the Court can better sort out,
among other things, the trustworthiness of Congress’s factfinding.179
By improving its understanding of Congress and, more generally, the
social facts of the dispute before it, the Court is less apt to box itself
into a corner. Specifically, since the legitimacy costs of overruling a
decision are significant, the Court may adhere to a premature, ill-
informed decision.180 For this reason, it is critically important that the
Court not get it wrong the first time around. Agenda control, while
hardly a guarantee, can help the Court understand both Congress’s
interest in getting the facts right and the factual premises of its deci-
sionmaking.
Sometimes, however, the Court cannot make use of agenda con-
trol to delay a decision. In the Independent Counsel case, for exam-
ple, a lower court finding that the statute was unconstitutional made it
impractical for the Court to refuse to hear the case.181 At the same
time, rather than speak definitively about the statute’s constitutional-
ity, the Justices could have decided the case narrowly, upholding the
statute while leaving open the possibility that the Court could revisit
177. There may be occasions, of course, where Congress is acting in the public interest but is
nevertheless uninterested in factfinding. When that happens, an empirically minded Court
should hesitate before embracing fact-dependent standards of review.
178. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 116 (1962) (advocating that restraint operate at the point of access,
before a case reaches the decision stage).
179. For a somewhat analogous argument, see Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 65 (1998) (defending “provisional adjudication,” in
part, because delaying strategies allow the Supreme Court “the benefit of [deciding cases
against the backdrop of] well-reasoned opinions by the federal courts of appeals and perhaps
the state courts of last resort”).
180. See supra notes 25-26, 111-33 (discussing the difficulties of overruling the “affecting
commerce” standard). For a thoughtful treatment of how path-dependency in the law encour-
ages Justices to make use of standing, denials of certiorari, and other avoidance doctrines, see
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 157-80, 310 (2000).
181. In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Had the Justices refused to hear the
case, the statute would have been effectively voided in the D.C. Circuit, the very circuit in which
a three-judge panel appoints independent counsels.
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the issue in another case. By saying as little as possible in the first in-
stance, this type of delaying strategy, unlike judicial minimalism,
looks to the Court—perhaps in a dialogue with the political
branches—to issue a broad ruling about the underlying constitutional
issue.182
Over time, of course, the Justices must sort out whether to em-
brace standards of review that either defer to, or are skeptical of,
congressional factfinding.183 On some issues, like those implicating
separation of powers concerns, Congress (at least sometimes) may
well have the institutional incentives to moderate its handiwork in or-
der to preserve the balance of powers.184 On other issues, like those
dealing with Congress’s federalism-implicated powers, this investiga-
tion may reveal that Congress’s desire to do that which is politically
popular is far stronger than its desire to self-police its powers under
either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.185 By observing Congress this way, the Court can sort out
whether Congress has the institutional incentives to take factfinding
seriously.186 Among other things, the Court can see how Congress
makes use of sunset provisions or other mechanisms that ensure that
lawmakers do not lose sight of the issue and/or shift the burden of in-
182. Christopher J. Peters, in a thoughtful review of the ever-burgeoning literature on judi-
cial minimalism, refers to this type of delaying strategy as “procedural minimalism.” Peters, su-
pra note 175, at 1513-20 (defending procedural minimalism as consistent with the Court’s duty
to speak to questions of rights).
183. In addition to factfinding, the Justices will also take into account theories of interpreta-
tion, political context, etc. Consequently, the Court’s view on congressional factfinding may,
ultimately, be trumped by other concerns.
184. See supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 100-33 and accompanying text. Perhaps for this reason, the Court, in
United States v. Morrison, made use of a stringent rule that made Congress’s voluminous fact-
finding irrelevant. 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (“[The Act] is supported by numerous findings re-
garding the serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families . . . .
But the existence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitution-
ality of Commerce Clause legislation.”). Specifically, the Court may have concluded that the
only way to limit Congress was to deem certain types of regulation outside of Congress’s Com-
merce Clause authority.
186. On occasion, the Court does just that. In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), for exam-
ple, the Court deferred to Congress’s choice of remedial schemes for alleged violations of the
First Amendment rights of government workers. Id. at 388-90 (“Congress is in a far better posi-
tion than a court to evaluate the impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees
on the efficiency of the civil service.”). A key aspect of the Court’s reasoning was its belief that
“Congress has a special interest in informing itself about . . . the Executive Branch” and that
“[i]n the past it has demonstrated its awareness . . . that supervisors might improperly attempt to
curtail their subordinates’ freedom of expression.” Id. at 389. For this reason, the Court de-
ferred to “Congress’ ability to make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability” of providing
remedies for federal employees sanctioned for expressing controversial views. Id.
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ertia to constituent and other interests that support reenactment of
the law.187
Operating within the Washington, D.C., beltway, moreover, the
Court can take into account the circumstances surrounding the en-
actment of legislation. In particular, as was true with the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, the Court can see whether competing interests within
Congress put pressure on the institution to take factfinding seri-
ously.188 Alternatively, it may be that logrolling or the absence of dis-
agreement within Congress produces legislation, like the public works
set-asides, the RFRA, and the GFSZA, where factfinding is simply
beside the point.189
Needless to say, these inquiries are indeterminate and, ulti-
mately, value-laden.190 Nevertheless, by thinking about the incentives
within Congress and observing how Congress acts on those incentives,
this type of agenda control can facilitate constructive constitutional
dialogues between Congress and the Court. Consider again the Inde-
pendent Counsel statute. When Congress enacted this statute, no one
could predict whether the Attorney General, in fact, would maintain
meaningful control of independent counsel investigations. Why then
should the Court assume either the best or the worst about congres-
sional factfinding?191 Instead, by making use of certiorari denials and
other delaying strategies,192 the Court can wait to see both how the
statute works and how Congress responds to the statute’s implemen-
tation. Courts simply “do not need to commit themselves so com-
187. Congress made use of sunset provisions with the line-item veto, the Independent Coun-
sel, and public works set-asides. See supra notes 72-97, 134-55 and accompanying text. Un-
funded mandates legislation, moreover, contains a procedural device allowing any member to
force floor consideration of states’ rights concerns. See supra note 124.
188. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 17-18, 111-21, 135-39 and accompanying text.
190. Consider, for example, federalism. While I conclude that Congress cannot be trusted to
self-police itself, several scholars have reached the opposite conclusion. See supra note 104.
191. Dissenting in Morrison v. Olson, Justice Antonin Scalia assumed the worst about con-
gressional factfinding, substituting his understanding of how the statute would work for that of
Congress. 487 U.S. 654, 701-03 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Although the Court’s opinion
asserts that the Attorney General had ‘no duty to comply with the [congressional] request’ . . .
that is not entirely accurate. He had a duty to comply unless he could conclude that there were
‘no reasonable grounds to believe,’ . . . that ‘further investigation’ was warranted.”). In sharp
contrast, the Court’s majority opinion effectively assumed the best about congressional fact-
finding, holding that the Attorney General maintained meaningful control of independent coun-
sel investigations. Id. at 692-93, 696 (“[T]he Attorney General retains the power to remove the
counsel for ‘good cause’ . . . . No independent counsel may be appointed without a specific re-
quest by the Attorney General . . . . The Act thus gives the Executive a degree of control over
the power to initiate an investigation by the independent counsel.”).
192. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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pletely and all at once. They can in cases of doubt use . . . techniques
that encourage legislatures, scholars, and even the public to engage
them in dialogue and give back data stronger then hunches.”193 In-
deed, by giving Congress breathing room in the first instance, the
Court creates incentives for Congress to demonstrate its bona fides by
paying attention to the law’s implementation.194
But is it possible to have an empirically informed constitutional
jurisprudence? After all, if the courts cannot and Congress will not
take factfinding seriously, there is little reason to contemplate crafting
standards of review that take factfinding into account. In attempting
to answer this question, I have advanced a decisionmaking model that
takes into account the circumstances in which Congress has the incen-
tives to take factfinding seriously.
Beyond identifying whether Congress or the Court is likely to do
a better job at sorting out the underlying social facts (something of in-
terest to Justices thinking about the consequences of choosing a fact-
dependent standard or a fact-insensitive rule), this incentives model
also embraces a normative theory of constitutional interpretation,
that is, that one of the principal purposes of judicial review is to guard
against special-interest legislation. Specifically, in advancing the pub-
lic interest, the Justices should craft standards of review that take into
account Congress’s interest in getting the facts right, at least over
time. When it comes to some type of legislation, e.g., separation of
powers, there is enough friction between the branches that Congress
will usually produce handiwork that reflects constitutional concerns.
In other contexts, like racial preferences or federalism, there is far
less reason to be confident of Congress’s ability to incorporate equal-
ity or federalism values when legislating.
193. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 267 n.3 (1982). In
the case of the Independent Counsel, a lower court finding that the statute was unconstitutional
forced the Supreme Court to hear the case. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. With
that said, rather than uphold the statute without qualifications, the Court could have issued a
narrower opinion, one that left open the question of whether the President’s control of the ex-
ecutive branch might be undermined by the statute.
194. Furthermore, by not committing itself to a particular vision of the facts (and, accord-
ingly, to Congress’s capacity as factfinder), the Court is not limited by a precedent whose factual
premises may prove incorrect. For similar reasons, the Court ought to be cautious about em-
bracing a rule that defers to any and all congressional factfinding. For example, in Metro Broad-
casting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), the Court was wrong to assume that Congress could be
trusted to sort out whether a nexus exists between programmatic diversity and a broadcaster’s
race. Id. at 578-84 (“Congress and the Commission have determined that . . . there is a nexus
between minority ownership and broadcasting diversity . . . . [W]e believe it a legitimate infer-
ence for Congress and the Commission to draw that as more minorities gain ownership and
policymaking roles in the media, varying perspectives will be more fairly represented . . . .”).
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I do not pretend that this model is fail-proof. The question of
whether Congress has the incentives to serve the public interest, not
special interests, is value-laden and indeterminate. With that said,
failings in this model call attention to how difficult it is for the Court
to navigate the law-fact divide. More to the point, by calling attention
to how difficult it is for courts to check Congress when employing
fact-dependent standards, this Essay sends a cautionary note to the
Court. In particular, while not disavowing such fact-dependent stan-
dards, this Essay suggests that Justices contemplating the adoption of
standards of review that give Congress the upper hand should have
confidence in congressional factfinding, and/or should want Congress
to control the issue, and/or should make use of some interpretive the-
ory that suggests that the Court should play a de minimis role.195
My proposal, as the title of this Essay suggests, is a preliminary
inquiry into ways that the Court can better take factfinding into ac-
count when crafting standards of review. Whatever one thinks of the
incentives model that I embrace, the enterprise of getting the Court
to think about how it and Congress finds facts as well as ways to im-
prove the quality of factfinding is critically important. If nothing else,
I hope this Essay is a small step in encouraging the Court to take fact-
finding into account when crafting standards of review.196
195. By sending such a cautionary note about fact-dependent standards, this Essay provides
some support for theorists who argue that the Court should, as a general matter, employ fact-
insensitive rules. E.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 121-
35 (1996) (noting the drawbacks of rules); Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All Er Nuthin’”:
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999) (defending rules); Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (1989) (same); Kath-
leen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62-69
(1992) (detailing arguments for rules and standards). At the same time, by suggesting that fact-
dependent standards sometimes be used, this Essay charts a middle ground in this debate.
196. Some of the times, of course, the Court will employ standards of review that place little
emphasis on factfinding. This may be because of the theories of interpretation that the Justices
employ, the case’s political setting, etc. When this happens, complaints that the Court is not
paying sufficient attention to the underlying facts may, ultimately, be little more than com-
plaints that the Court (by not finding those social facts relevant) is making use of the wrong
theory of interpretation. Merritt, supra note 5, at 1288 (arguing that, in calling for some empiri-
cism in the law, Judge Posner “disagrees with the Court’s theory of the Equal Protection
Clause—not with its understanding of the facts”).
